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Abstract
This paper introduces a unified model of consistency and isolation that minimizes the gap between
how these guarantees are defined and how they are perceived. Our approach is premised on a simple
observation: applications view storage systems as black-boxes that transition through a series of states, a
subset of which are observed by applications. For maximum clarity, isolation and consistency guarantees
should be expressed as constraints on those states. Instead, these properties are currently expressed
as constraints on operation histories that are not visible to the application. We show that adopting a
state-based approach to expressing these guarantees brings forth several benefits. First, it makes it easier
to focus on the anomalies that a given isolation or consistency level allows (and that applications must deal
with), rather than those that it proscribes. Second, it unifies the often disparate theories of isolation and
consistency and provides a structure for composing these guarantees. We leverage this modularity to apply
to transactions (independently of the isolation level under which they execute) the equivalence between
causal consistency and session guarantees that Chockler et al. had proved for single operations. Third,
it brings clarity to the increasingly crowded field of proposed consistency and isolation properties by
winnowing spurious distinctions: we find that the recently proposed parallel snapshot isolation introduced
by Sovran et al. is in fact a specific implementation of an older guarantee, lazy consistency (or PL-2+),
introduced by Adya et al.
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1 Introduction
Large-scale applications such as Facebook, Amadeus, or Twitter offload the managing of data at scale to
replicated and/or distributed systems. These systems, which often span multiple regions or continents, must
sustain high-throughput, guarantee low-latency, and remain available across failures.
To increase scalability within a site, databases harness the power of multicore computing [13, 26, 27, 56,
57] by deploying increasingly complex concurrency control algorithms. Faced with the latent scalability
bottleneck of serializability, commercial systems often privilege instead weaker but more scalable notions
of isolation, such as snapshot isolation or read committed [1, 12, 47, 51]. Likewise, several recent research
efforts focus on improving the scalability of strong consistency guarantees in distributed storage systems [35,
50, 52, 59]. Modern large-scale distributed systems, however, to increase scalability across sites largely
renounce strong consistency in favour of weaker guarantees, from causal consistency to per-session-only
guarantees [11, 19, 23, 25, 36, 39, 40, 44, 45, 58].
This trend poses an additional burden on the application programmer, as weaker isolation and consistency
guarantees allow for counter-intuitive application behaviors: relaxing the ordering of operations yields better
performance, but introduces schedules and anomalies that could not arise if transactions executed atomically
and sequentially. Consider a bank account with a $50 balance and no overdraft allowed. Read-committed
allows two transactions to concurrently withdraw $45, leaving the account with a negative balance [12].
Likewise, causal consistency ensures that write-read dependencies are enforced, but provides no meaningful
way to handle write-write conflicts [24].
To mitigate programming complexity, many commercial databases and distributed storage systems [5, 6,
11, 29, 30, 43–45, 47, 51] interact with applications through a front-end that, like a valve, is meant to shield
applications from the complex concurrency and replication protocols at play. This valve, however, is leaky at
best: a careful understanding of the system that implements a given isolation or weak consistency level is
oftentimes necessary to determine which anomalies the system will admit.
Indeed, isolation and consistency levels often assume features specific to the systems for which they
were first defined—from the properties of storage (e.g., whether it is single or multiversioned [14]); to the
chosen concurrency control (e.g., whether it is based on locking or timestamps [12]); or to other system
features (e.g., the existence of a centralized timestamp [28]). These assumptions, furthermore, are not always
explicit: the claim, in the original ANSI SQL specification, that serializability is equivalent to preventing four
phenomena [12] only holds for lock-based, single version databases. Clarity on such matters is important: to
this day, multiversioned commercial databases claiming to implement serializability in fact implement the
weaker notion of snapshot isolation [9, 28, 48].
We believe that at the root of this complexity is the current practice of defining consistency and isolation
guarantees in terms of the ordering of low-level operations such as reads and writes, or sends and receives.
This approach has several drawbacks for application programmers. First, it requires them to reason about
the ordering of operations that they cannot directly observe. Second, it makes it easy, as we have seen, to
inadvertently contaminate what should be system-independent guarantees with system-specific assumptions.
Third, by relying on operations that are only meaningful within one of the layers in the system’s stack, it
makes it hard to reason end-to-end about the system’s guarantees.
To bridge the semantic gap between how isolation and consistency guarantees are specified and how
they are being used, we introduce a new, unified framework for expressing both consistency and isolation
guarantees that relies exclusively on application-observable states rather than on low-level operations. The
framework is general: we use it to express most modern consistency and isolation definitions, and prove that
the definitions we obtain are equivalent to their existing counterparts.
In addition to cleanly separating consistency and isolation guarantees from the implementation of the
system to which they apply, we find that the new framework yields three advantages:
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1. It brings clarity to the increasingly crowded field of proposed consistency and isolation properties,
winnowing out spurious distinctions. In particular, we show that the distinction between PSI [20, 52]
and lazy consistency [1, 2] is in fact an artefact of the replication model assumed.
2. It provides a simple framework for composing consistency and isolation guarantees. We leverage its
expressiveness to prove that causal consistency is equivalent to jointly guaranteeing all four session
guarantees (read-your writes, monotonic reads, writes follow reads, and monotonic writes [22, 53])
independently of the isolation under which transactions execute.
3. It simplifies reasoning end-to-end about a system’s design, opening up new opportunities for optimizing
its implementation. In particular, we show that PSI can be enforced without totally ordering the
transactions executed at each site (as the original PSI definition instead requires), thus making the
system less prone to have its performance dictated by the rate at which its slowest shard (data partition)
can enforce dependencies.
We provide an extended motivation in Section 2. We introduce the model in Section 3 and use it to
define isolation in Section 4 and consistency in Section 5. We highlight practical benefits of our approach in
Section 6. Finally, we summarize and conclude in Section 7.
2 A system’s case for a new formalism
Much of the complexity associated with weakly consistent systems stems from an intricate three-way semantic
gap between how applications are encouraged to use these systems, how the guarantees these systems provide
are expressed, and how they are implemented.
On the one hand, applications are invited to think of these systems as black boxes that benevolently hide
the complexity involved in achieving the availability, integrity, and performance guarantees that applications
care about. For example, PaaS (Platform as a Service) cloud-based storage systems [29, 43], databases [30]
or webservers [5] free applications from having to configure hardware, and let them simply pay for reserved
storage or throughput [30, 43]. Essentially, it is as if applications were querying or writing to a logically
centralized, failure-free node that will scale as much as one’s wallet will allow. On the other hand, the precise
guarantees that these black boxes provide are generally difficult to pin down, as different systems often give
them implementation-specific twists that can only be understood by looking inside the box.
For example, the exact meaning of session guarantees, present in Bayou [55], Corba [22] and, more recently,
in Pileus [54] and DocumentDB [44], depends on whether the system to which they apply implements a
total order of write operations across client sessions. Consider the execution in Figure 1: does it satisfy the
session guarantee monotonic reads, which calls for reads to reflect a monotonically increasing set of writes?
The answer depends on whether the underlying system provides a total order of write operations across
client sessions (like DocumentDB), or just a partial order based on the order of writes in each session. The
specification of monotonic reads, however, is silent on this issue.
Even the classic notion of serializability [49] can fall pray to inconsistencies. In theory, its guarantee
is clear: it states that an interleaved execution of transactions must be equivalent to a serial schedule. In
practice, however, the system interpretations of that notion can differ. Consider the execution in Figure 1(a),
consisting of two interleaved write-only transactions: is it serializable? It would appear so, as it is equivalent
to the serial schedule (T1, T2). The answer, however, depends on whether the underlying databases allows for
writes to be re-ordered, a feature that is expensive to implement. And indeed, a majority of the self-declared
serializable databases surveyed in Figure 1(a) do actually reject the schedule. In contrast, Figure 1(b) depicts
a non-serializable schedule that exhibits write-skew [28]. Yet, that execution is allowed by systems that claim
to be serializable, such as Oracle 12c. The source of the confusion is the very definition of serializability.
Oracle 12c uses the definition of the original SQL standard, based on the four ANSI SQL phenomena
that it disallows [12]. In single-versioned systems, preventing these phenomena is indeed equivalent to
serializability; but in a multiversion system (such as Oracle 12c) it no longer is.
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Fundamentally, consistency guarantees are contracts between the storage system and its clients, specifying
a well-defined set of admissible behaviors— i.e., the set of values that each read is allowed to return. To be
useful, they need to be precise and unchanging. When implicit assumptions about the implementation of the
system are allowed to encroach, however, these essential attributes can suffer.
3 Model
Existing consistency or isolation models are defined as constraints on the ordering of the read and write
operations that the storage system performs [1, 15, 20, 22]. Applications, however, cannot directly observe
this ordering. To them, the storage system is a black box. All they can observe are the values returned by
the read operations they issue: they experience the storage system as if it were going through a sequence of
atomic state transitions, of which they observe a subset. To make it easier for applications to reason about
consistency and isolation, we adopt the same viewpoint of the applications that must ultimately use these
guarantees. We propose a model based on application-observable states rather than on the invisible history of
the low-level operations performed by the system.
Intuitively, a storage system guarantees a specific isolation or consistency level if it can produce an
execution (a sequence of atomic state transitions) that is 1) consistent with the values observed by applications
and 2) valid, in that it satisfies the guarantees of the desired isolation/consistency level. In essence, the values
returned by the systems constrain the set of states that the system can bring forth to demonstrate that it can
produce a valid execution.
More formally, we define a storage system S with respect to a set K of keys, and V of values; a system
state s is a unique mapping from key to values. For simplicity, we assume that each value is uniquely
identifiable, as is common practice in existing formalisms [1, 15] and practical systems (ETags in Azure
and S3, timestamps in Cassandra). There can thus be no ambiguity, when reading an object, as to which
transaction wrote its content.. In the initial system state, all keys have value ⊥.
To unify our treatment of consistency and isolation, we assume that applications modify the storage
system’s state using transactions; we model individual operations as transactions consisting of a single
read or a single write. A transaction t is a tuple (Σt,
to−→), where Σt is the set of operations in t, and to−→
is a total order on Σt. Operation can be either reads or writes. Read operation r(k, v) retrieves value v
by reading key k; write operation w(k, v) updates k to its new value v. The read set of t contains the
keys read by t: Rt = {k|r(k, v) ∈ Σt}. Similarly, the write set of t contains the keys that t updates:
Wt = {k|w(k, v) ∈ Σt}. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that a transaction only writes a key once.
Applying a transaction t to a state s transitions the system to a state s′ that is identical to s in every key
except those written by t. We refer to s as the parent state of t, and refer to the transaction that generated s’ as
ts′ . Formally,
Definition 1. s −→
t
s′ ⇒ ([((k, v) ∈ s′ ∧ (k, v) 6∈ s) = k ∈ Wt] ∧ (w(k, v) ∈ Σt)⇒ (k, v) ∈ s′)
We denote the set of keys in which s and s′ differ as ∆(s, s′).
3
An execution e for a set of transactions T is a totally ordered set defined by the pair (Se, t∈T−−→), where Se
is the set of states generated by applying, starting from the system’s initial state, a permutation of all the
transaction in T . We write s ∗−→ s′ (respectively, s +−→ s′) to denote a sequence of zero (respectively, one) or
more state transitions from s to s′ in e. Note that, while e identifies the state transitions produced by each
transaction t ∈ T , it does not specify the subset of states in Se that each operation in t can read from. In
general, multiple states in Se may be compatible with the value returned by any given operation. We call this
subset the operation’s candidate read states.
Definition 2. Given an execution e for a set of transactions T , let t ∈ T and let sp denote t’s parent state.
The candidate read states for a read operation o = r(k, v) ∈ Σt is the set of states
RSe(o) = {s ∈ Se|s ∗−→ sp ∧
(
(k, v) ∈ s ∨ (∃w(k, v) ∈ Σt : w(k, v) to−→ r(k, v))
)}
To prevent transactions from reading from the future, we restrict the set of valid candidate read states to
those no later than sp. Additionally, once t writes v to k, we require all subsequent read operations o ∈ Σt to
return v [1].
By convention, the candidate read states of a write operation include all the states s ∈ Se that s ∗−→ sp. It is
easy to prove that the candidate read states of any operation define a subsequence of contiguous states in the
total order that e defines on Se. We refer to the first state in that sequence as sfo, and to the last state as slo.
The predicate PREREADe(T ) guarantees that such states exist:
Definition 3. Let PREREADe(t) ≡ ∀o ∈ Σt : RSe(o) 6= ∅. Then PREREADe(T ) ≡ ∀t ∈ T :
PREREADe(t).
We say that a state s is complete for t in e if every operation in t can read from s. We write:
Definition 4. COMPLETEe,t(s) ≡ s ∈
⋂
o∈Σt
RSe(o)
Finally, we introduce the notion of internal read consistency: internal read consistency states that read
operations that follow each other in the transaction order should read from a monotonically increasing state.
We write:
Definition 5. IRCe(t) ≡ ∀o, o′ ∈ Σt : o′ to−→ o⇒ ¬(slo +−→ sfo′)
4 Isolation
Isolation guarantees specify the valid set of executions for a given set of transactions T . The long-
established [1, 14, 15] way to accomplish this has been to constrain the history of the low-level operations
that the system is allowed to perform when processing transactions. Our new approach eschews this history,
which is invisible to applications, in favor of application-observable states. Before we introduce our work,
we provide some context for it by summarizing some of the key definitions and results from Adya’s classic,
history-based, treatment of isolation [1].
4.1 A history-based specification of isolation guarantees
Definition 6. A history H over a set of transactions consists of two parts: (i) a partial order of events E that
reflects the operations (e.g., read, write, abort, commit) of those transactions; and (ii) a version order, <<,
that totally orders committed object versions.
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Definition 7. We consider three kinds of direct read/write conflicts:
Directly write-depends Ti writes a version of x and Tj writes the next version of x (Ti
ww−−→ Tj)
Directly read-depends Ti writes a version of x that Tj then reads (Ti
wr−→ Tj)
Directly anti-depends Ti reads a version of x, and Tj writes the next version of x (Ti
rw−→ Tj)
Definition 8. We say that Tj start-depends on Ti (denoted as Ti
sd−→ Tj if ci <t bj , where ci denotes Ti’s
commit timestamp and bj Tj’s start timestamp, i.e., if Tj starts after Ti commits.
Definition 9. Each node in the direct serialization graph DSG(H) arising from a history H corresponds to a
committed transaction inH . Directed edges in DSG(H) correspond to different types of direct conflicts. There
is a read/write/anti-dependency edge from transaction Ti to transaction Tj if Tj directly read/write/antidepends
on Ti.
Definition 10. The Started-ordered Serialization Graph SSG(H) contains the same nodes and edges as
DSG(H) along with start-dependency edges.
Definition 11. Adya identifies the following phenomena:
G0: Write Cycles DSG(H) contains a directed cycle consisting entirely of write-dependency edges.
G1a: Dirty Reads H contains an aborted transaction Ti and a committed transaction Tj such that Tj has
read the same object (maybe via a predicate) modified by Ti.
G1b: Intermediate Reads H contains a committed transaction Tj that has read a version of object x
written by transaction Ti that was not Ti’s final modification of x.
G1c: Circular Information Flow DSG(H) contains a directed cycle consisting entirely of dependency
edges.
G1: G1a ∨ G1b ∨ G1c.
G2: Anti-dependency Cycles DSG(H) contains a directed cycle having one or more anti-dependency
edges.
G-Single: Single Anti-dependency Cycles DSG(H) contains a directed cycle with exactly one anti-
dependency edge.
G-SIa: Interference SSG(H) contains a read/write-dependency edge from Ti to Tj without there also
being a start-dependency edge from Ti to Tj .
G-SIb: Missed Effects SSG(H) contains a directed cycle with exactly one anti-dependency edge.
G-SI: G-SIa ∨ G-SIb.
Definition 12. Adya defines the following isolation levels in terms of the phenomena in Definition 11:
Serializability (PL-3) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G2 Read Committed (PL-2)≡ ¬G1
Read Uncommitted (PL-1) ≡ ¬G0 Snapshot Isolation ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-SI
4.2 A state-based specification of isolation guarantees
In our approach based on observable states, isolation guarantees specify the valid set of executions for a
given set of transactions T by constraining each transaction t ∈ T in two ways. First, they limit which
states, among those in the candidate read sets of the operations in t, are admissible. Second, they restrict
which states can serve as parent states for t. We express these constraints by means of a commit test: for an
execution e to be valid under a given isolation level I , each transaction t in e must satisfy the commit test for
I, written CTI (t,e).
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Serializability COMPLETEe,t(sp)
Snapshot Isolation ∃s ∈ Se. COMPLETEe,t(s) ∧(∆(s, sp) ∩Wt = ∅)
Read Committed PREREADe(t)
Read Uncommitted True
Table 1: ANSI SQL Commit Tests
Definition 13. A storage system satisfies an isolation level I ≡ ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTI(t, e).
Table 1 shows the commit tests for the four most common ANSI SQL isolation levels. We informally motivate
their rationale below.
Serializability. Serializability requires the values observed by the operations in each transaction t to be
consistent with those that would have been observed in a sequential execution. The commit test enforces this
requirement through two complementary conditions on observable states. First, all operations of t should read
from the same state s, thereby ensuring that transactions never observe the effects of concurrently running
transactions. Second, s should be the parent state of t, i.e., the state that t transitions from.
Snapshot isolation (SI). Like serializability, SI prevents every transaction t from seeing the effects of
concurrently running transactions. The commit test enforces this requirement by having all operations in t
read from the same state s, where s is a state produced by a transaction that precedes t in the execution e
However, SI no longer insists on s being t’s parent state sp: other transactions may commit in between s and
sp, whose operations t will not observe. The commit test only forbids t from modifying any of the keys that
changed value as the system’s state progressed from s to sp.
Read committed. Read committed allows t to see the effects of concurrent transactions, as long as they are
committed. The commit test therefore no longer constrains all operations in t to read from the same state;
instead, it only requires them to read from state that precedes t in the execution e.
Read uncommitted. Read uncommitted allows t to see the effects of concurrent transactions, whether they
have committed or not. The commit test reflects this permissiveness, to the point of allowing transactions to
read arbitrary values. The reason for this seemingly excessive laxity is that isolation models in databases
consider only committed transactions and are therefore unable to distinguish between values produced by
aborted transactions and by altogether imaginary writes. This distinction is not lost in environments, such as
transactional memory, where correctness depends on providing guarantees such as opacity [31] for all live
transactions. We discuss this further in Section 7.
Although these tests make no mention of histories, they each admit the same set of executions of the
corresponding history-based condition formulated by Adya [1]. In Appendix B.1, Appendix B.2 and Appendix
B.3, we prove the following theorems, respectively:
Theorem 1. Let I be Serializability (SER). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTSER(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G2.
Theorem 2. Let I be Snapshot Isolation (SI). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-SI
Theorem 3. Let I be Read Committed (RC). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTRC(t, e) ≡ ¬G1
Theorem 4. Let I be Read Uncommitted (RU). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTRU (t, e) ≡ ¬G0
4.2.1 Discussion
The above theorems establish that a specification of isolation guarantees based on client-observable states
is as expressive as one based on histories. Adopting a client-centric perspective, however, has a distinct
advantage: it makes it easier for application programmers to understand the anomalies allowed by weak
isolation levels.
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Withdraw(acc,amnt)
s = READ(s) ; c = READ(C)
if (s+c>0)
  if (acc=S) WRITE(S,s-amnt) else WRITE(C,c-amnt)
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Figure 2: Simple Banking Application. Alice and Bob share checking and savings accounts. Withdrawals are allowed as long as the sum of both
account is greater than zero
To illustrate this “intuition gap”, consider the simple banking example of Figure 2. Alice and Bob share
checking (C) and saving (S) accounts, each holding $30. To avoid the bank’s wrath, before performing a
withdrawal they check that the total funds in their accounts allow for it. They then withdraw the amount
from the specified account, using the other account to eventually cover any overdraft. Suppose Alice and
Bob try concurrently to each withdraw $40 from, respectively, their checking and savings account, and issue
transactions tw1 and tw2. Figure 2(a) shows an execution under serializability. Because transactions read
from their parent state, tw2 observes tw1’s withdrawal and, since the balance of Bob’s accounts is below $40,
aborts.
In contrast, consider the execution under snapshot isolation in Figure 2(b). It is legal for both tw1 and tw2
to read the same state s1, find that the combined funds in the two accounts exceed $40, and, unaware of each
other, proceed to generate an execution whose final state s3 will get Alice and Bob in trouble with the bank.
This anomaly, commonly referred to as write-skew, arises because tw2 is allowed to read from a state other
than the most recent state. Defining snapshot isolation in terms of observable states makes the source of this
anomaly obvious, arguably to a greater degree than the standard history-based definition, which characterizes
snapshot isolation as “disallowing all cycles consisting of direct (write-write and write-read) dependencies
and at most a single anti-dependency”.
Though we have focused our discussion on ANSI SQL isolation levels that do not consider real-time, our
model can straightforwardly be extended to support strict serializability [32] as follows.
Let O be a time oracle that assigns distinct start and commit timestamps (t.start and t.commit) to every
transaction t ∈ T . A transaction t1 time-precedes t2 (we write t1 <s t2) if t1.commit < t2.start. Strict
serializability can then be defined by adding the following condition to the serializability commit test:
∀t′ ∈ T : t′ <s t⇒ st′ ∗−→ st.
5 Consistency
Though isolation guarantees typically do not regulate how transactions from a given client should be ordered 1,
they tacitly assume that transactions from the same client will be executed in client-order, as they naturally
would in a centralized or synchronously replicated storage system. In weakly consistent systems, where
transactions can be asynchronously replicated between sites, this assumption no longer holds: two transactions
from the same client may be re-ordered if they happen to be executed on different replicas. To bring back
order, distributed systems introduce the notion of sessions. Sessions encapsulate the sequence of transactions
performed by a single entity (a thread, client, or application). Informally, their aim is to provide each entity
with a view of the system consistent with its own actions;
Definition 14. A session se is a tuple (Tse,
se−→) where se−→ is a total order over the transactions in Tse such
that Tse ⊆ T .
To provide a foundation to a common theory of isolation and consistency, we define session-based
consistency guarantees for transactions. Session guarantees have traditionally been defined for operations [17,
22, 53]: our definitions can be mapped back by considering single-operation transactions.
1Strict serializability is the exception to this rule.
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We first introduce the definition of sequential consistency [37]. Sequential consistency requires read
operations within each transaction observe monotonically increasing states and have non-empty candidate
read sets and, like previously defined isolation levels, demands that all sessions observe a single execution.
Unlike isolation levels, however, sequential consistency also requires transactions to take effect in the order
specified by their session. We define the commit test for sequential consistency as follows:
CTSC(e, t) ≡ PREREADe(t) ∧ IRCe(t) ∧ (∀se ∈ SE : ∀ti se−→ tj : (sti +−→ stj ∧ ∀o ∈ Σtj : sti ∗−→ slo))
Guaranteeing the existence of a single execution across all clients is often prohibitively expensive if sites
are geographically distant. Many systems instead allow clients in different sessions to observe distinct
executions. Clients consequently perceive the system as consistent with their own actions, but not necessarily
with those of others. To this effect, we reformulate the commit test into a session test: for an execution e to be
valid under a given session se and session guarantee SG, each transaction t in Tse must satisfy the session
test for SG, written SESSIONSG(se,t,e).
Definition 15. A storage system satisfies a session guarantee SG ≡ ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse :
SESSIONSG(se, t, e).
Intuitively, session tests invert the order between the existential qualifier for execution and the universal
quantifier for sessions. Table 2 shows the session tests for the most common session guarantees. We
informally motivate their rationale below.
Read-My-Writes This session guarantee states that a client will read from a state that includes any
preceding writes in its session. RMW is a fairly weak guarantee: it does not constrain the order in which
writes take effect, nor does it provide any guarantee on the reads of a client who never writes, or say anything
about the outcome of reads performed in other sessions (as it limits the scope of PREREAD only to the
transactions of its session). The session test is simply content with asking for the read state of every operation
in a transaction’s session to be after the commit state of all preceding update transactions in that session.
Monotonic Reads Monotonic reads, instead, constrains a client’s reads to observe an increasingly up-to-
date state of the database: this applies to transactions in a session, and to operations within the transaction
(by IRC). The notion of “up-to-date” here may vary by client, as the storage is free to arrange transactions
differently for each session’s execution. The only way for the client to detect an MR violation is hence to read
a value three times, reading the initial value, a new value, and the initial value again. Moreover, a client is not
guaranteed to see the effects of its own write: MR allows for clients to read from monotonically increasing
but stale states.
Monotonic Writes In contrast, monotonic writes constrains the ordering of writes within a session: the
sequence of state transitions in each execution must be consistent with the order of update transactions in
every session. Unlike MR and RMW, monotonic writes is a global guarantee, at least when it comes to update
transactions. The PREREAD requirement for read operations, instead, continues to apply only within each
session.
Writes-Follow-Reads Like monotonic writes, writes-follow-reads is a global guarantee, this time covering
reads as well as writes. It states that, if a transaction reads from a state s, all transactions that follow in that
session must be ordered after s in every execution that a client may observe.
Causal Consistency Finally, causal consistency guarantees that any execution will order transactions in
a causally consistent order: read operations in a session will see monotonically increasing read states, and
commit in session order. Likewise, transactions that read from a state s will be ordered after s in all sessions.
This relationship is transitive: every transaction that reads s (or that follows in the session) will also be
ordered after s.
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Read-My-Writes (RMW) PREREADe(Tse) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t :Wt′ 6= ∅ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo
Monotonic Reads (MR) PREREADe(Tse) ∧ IRCe(t) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : ∀o′ ∈ Σt′ : ¬(slo +−→ sfo′)
Monotonic Writes (MW) PREREADe(Tse) ∧ ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′−−→ tj : (Wti 6= ∅ ∧Wtj 6= ∅)⇒ sti +−→ stj
Writes-Follow-Reads (WFR) PREREADe(T ) ∧ ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′−−→ tj : ∀oi ∈ Σti :Wtj 6= ∅ ⇒ sfoi +−→ stj
Causal Consistency (CC)
PREREADe(T ) ∧ IRCe(t) ∧ (∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : st′ ∗−→ slo)
∧(∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj )
Table 2: Session Guarantees
6 Practical benefits
In addition to reducing the gap between how isolation and consistency guarantees are defined and how they
are perceived by their users, definitions based on client-observable states provide further benefits.
6.1 Economy
Focusing on client-observable states frees definitions from implementation-specific assumptions. Removing
these artefacts can bring out similarities and winnow out spurious distinctions in the increasingly crowded
field of isolation and consistency.
Consider, for example, parallel snapshot isolation (PSI), recently proposed by Sovran et al [52] and lazy
consistency, introduced by Adya et al [1, 2]. Both isolation levels are appealing as they are implementable
at scale in geo-replicated settings. Indeed, PSI aims to offer a scalable alternative to snapshot isolation by
relaxing the order in which transaction are allowed to commit on geo-replicated sites. The specification of
PSI is given as an abstract specification code that an implementation must emulate.
Definition 16. PSI enforces three main properties:
• P1 (Site Snapshot Read): All operations read the most recent committed version at the transaction’s
site as of the time when the transaction began.
• P2 (No Write-Write Conflicts): The write sets of each pair of committed somewhere-concurrent
transactions must be disjoint (two transactions are somewhere concurrent if they are concurrent on
site(T1) or site(T2).
• P3 (Commit Causality Across Sites): If a transaction T1 commits at a site A before a transaction T2
starts at site A, then T1 cannot commit after T2 at any site.
PL-2+, on the other hand, guarantees consistent reads (transactions never partially observe the effects of
other transactions) and disallows lost updates. Formally:
Definition 17. Lazy Consistency (PL-2+) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-single
At first blush, these system-centric definitions bear little resemblance to each other. Yet, when their authors
explain their intuitive meaning from a client’s perspective, similarities emerge. Cerone et al. [20] characterizes
PSI as requiring that transactions read from a causally consistent state and that concurrent transactions do
not write the same object. Adya describes PL-2+ in intriguingly similar terms: “PL-2+ provides a notion of
causal consistency since it ensures that a transaction is placed fter all transactions that causally affect it” [1].
The “intuition gap” between how these guarantees are formally expressed and how they are experienced by
clients makes it hard to appreciate how these guarantees actually compare.
Formulating isolation and consistency in terms of client-observable states eliminates this gap by forcing
definitions that inherently specify guarantees according to how they are perceived by clients. The client-
centric definition of PSI given below, for example, makes immediately clear that a valid PSI execution must
ensure that all transactions observe the effects of transactions that they depend on.
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Definition 18. For each transaction t, let its precede-set contain the set of transactions after which t is
ordered. A transaction t′ precedes t if (i) t reads a value that t′ wrote; or (ii) t writes an object modified by t′
and the execution orders t′ before t; or (iii) t′ precedes t′′ and t′′ precedes t.
D-PRECe(tˆ) = {t|∃o ∈ Σtˆ : t = tsfo} ∪ {t|st +−→ stˆ ∧Wtˆ ∩Wt 6= ∅}
PRECe(tˆ) =
(
∪t∈D-PRECe(tˆ)PRECe(t)
)
∪ D-PRECe(tˆ)
CTPSI(t, e) ≡ PREREADe(t) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : o.k ∈ Wt′ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo
Motivated by the additional clarity afforded by this definition, we investigated further the relationship
between PSI and lazy consistency and found that, perhaps surprisingly, PL-2+ and PSI are indeed equivalent.
In Appendix D we prove that this client-centric, state-based definition of PSI is equivalent to both the
axiomatic formulation of PSI (PSIA) by Cerone et al. and to the cycle-based specification of PL-2+:
Theorem 5. Let I be PSI. Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-single
Theorem 6. Let I be PSI. Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e) ≡ PSIA
6.2 Composition
Formulating isolation and consistency guarantees on the basis of client-observable states makes them not just
easier to understand, but also to compose. Composing such guarantees is often desirable in practice to avoid
counter-intuitive behaviors. For example, when considered in isolation, monotonic reads lets transactions
take effect in an order inconsistent with session order, and monotonic writes puts no constraints on reads.
Systems like DocumentDB thus compose multiple such guarantees in their implementation, but have no way
of articulating formally the new guarantee that their implementations offer. Expressing guarantees as local
session tests makes it easy to formalize their composition.
Definition 19. A storage system satisfies a set of session guarantees G iff
∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : ∀SG ∈ G : SESSIONSG(se, t, e)
An analogous definition specifies the meaning of combining isolation levels. Once formalized, such
combinations can be easily compared against existing standalone consistency guarantees. For example,
generalizing a result by Chockler et al’s [22], we prove in Appendix C that also when using transactions the
four session guarantees, taken together, are equivalent to causal consistency.
Theorem 7. Let G = {RMW,MR,MW,WFR}, then
∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONG(se, t, e) ≡ ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONCC(se, t, e)
This result holds independently of the transactions’ isolation level, as it enforces no relationship between
a transaction’s parent state and the read states of the operations of that transaction. Sometimes, however,
constraining the isolation level of transactions within a session may be useful: think, for example, of a
large-scale distributed system that would like transactions to execute atomically, while preserving session
order. Once again, formulating isolation and consistency guarantees in terms of observable states makes
expressing such requirements straightforward: all that is needed to modularly combine guarantees is to
combine their corresponding commit and session tests.
Definition 20. A storage system satisfies a session guarantee SG and isolation level I iff
∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONSG(se, t, e) ∧ CTI(t, e).
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Figure 3: Number of dependencies per transactions as a function of
time when running PL-2+ vs SI at each site. Experiments are run
using TARDiS [24], a geo-replicated transactional key-value store
that supports both snapshot isolation and parallel snapshot isolation.
Our workload consists of read-write transactions (three reads, three
writes) accessing 10,000 keys according to a uniform distribution.
Experiments are run on a shared local cluster of machines equipped
with a 2.67GHz Intel Xeon CPU X5650 with 48GB of memory and
connected by a 2Gbps network. Inter-machine ping latencies aver-
age 0.15 ms. Each experiment is run with three dedicated server
machines. SI artificially forces transactions to be dependent on ev-
ery other transaction at that site, while lazy consistency establishes
a dependency only when there is an actual data conflict. This has
little impact on performance during failure-free executions, but can
exacerbate the impact of slowdown cascades.
6.3 Scalability
As we observed earlier, applications are encouraged to think of weakly consistent systems as benevolent
black boxes that hide, among others, the details of replication. Since replicas are invisible to clients, our
new client-centric definitions of consistency and isolation make no mention of them, giving developers full
flexibility in how these guarantees should be implemented.
In contrast, in their current system-centric formulations, several consistency and isolation guarantees not
only explicitly refer to replicas, but they subject operations within each replica to stronger requirements
than what is called for by these guarantees’ end-to-end obligations. For example, the original definition of
parallel snapshot isolation [52] requires individual replicas to enforce snapshot isolation, even as it globally
only offers (as we prove in Theorem 5) the guarantees of Lazy Consistency/PL-2+ [1, 2]. Similarly, several
definitions of causal consistency interpret the notion of thread of execution [3] as serializing all operations
that execute on the same site [8, 21, 42]. Requiring individual sites to offer stronger guarantees that what
applications can observe not only runs counter to an intuitive end-to-end argument, but—as these guarantees
translate into unnecessary dependencies between operations and transactions that must then be honored across
sites— can have significant implications on a system’s ability to provide a given consistency guarantee at
scale. We show in Figure 6.3 that, for a simple transactional workload, guaranteeing per-site PL-2+ rather
than snapshot isolation can reduce the number of dependencies per transaction by two orders of magnitude
(175×).
7 Related work and conclusion
Most past definitions of isolation and consistency [1, 7, 12, 14–17, 22, 28, 33, 49, 52, 53] refer to specific
orderings of low-level operations and to system properties that cannot be easily observed or understood by
applications. To better align these definitions with what clients perceive, recent work [8,20,41] distinguishes
between concrete executions (the nuts-and-bolts implementations detail) and abstract executions (the system
behaviour as perceived by the client) on its way to introduce observable causal consistency, a refinement of
causal consistency where causality can be inferred by client observations. Attiya et al. introduce the notion
of observable causal consistency [8], a refinement on causal consistency where causality can be inferred by
client observations. Likewise, Cerone et al. [20] introduce the dual notions of visibility and arbitration to
define, axiomatically, a large number of existing isolation levels. All continue, however, to reason about
correctness as constraints on ordering of read and write operations. Our model takes their approach a step
further: it directly defines consistency and isolation in terms of the observable states that are routinely used
by developers to express application invariants [4, 10].
Limitations Our model has two main limitations. First, it does not constrain the behavior of ongoing
transactions, as it assumes that applications never make externally visible decisions based on uncommitted
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data. It thus cannot express consistency models, like opacity [31] or virtual world consistency [34] designed
to prevent STM transactions from accessing an invalid memory location. Second, our model enforces
a total order on executions, which does not easily account with recently proposed forking consistency
models [18, 24, 38, 42]. We leave extending the model in this direction as future work.
Conclusion We present a new way to reason about consistency and isolation based on application-
observable states. This approach (i) maps more naturally to what applications can observe, in turn making
it obvious what anomalies distinct isolation/consistency levels allow; (ii) provides a structure to compose
and compare isolation and consistency guarantees; and (iii) enables performance optimizations by reasoning
about consistency guarantees end-to-end.
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Appendix A Adya et al’s model for specifying weak isolation
Adya et al. [1] introduces a cycle-based framework for specifying weak isolation levels. We summarize its main
definitions and theorems here.
To capture a given system run, Adya uses the notion of history.
Definition 21. A history H over a set of transactions consists of two parts: i) a partial order of events E that reflects
the operations (e.g., read, write, abort, commit) of those transactions, and ii) a version order, <<, that is a total order
on committed object versions.
We note that the version-order associated with a history is implementation specific. As stated in Bernstein et al [15]:
as long as there exists a version order such that the corresponding direct serialization graph satisfies a given isolation
level, the history satisfies that isolation level.
The model introduces several types of direct read/write conflicts, used to specify the direct serialization graph.
Definition 22. Direct conflicts:
Directly write-depends Ti writes a version of x, and Tj writes the next version of x, denoted as Ti
ww−−→ Tj
Directly read-depends Ti writes a version of x, and Tj reads the version of x Ti writes, denoted as Ti
wr−−→ Tj
Directly anti-depends Ti reads a version of x, and Tj writes the next version of x, denoted as Ti
rw−−→ Tj
Definition 23. Time-Precedes Order. The time-precedes order, ≺t , is a partial order specified for history H such that:
1. bi ≺t ci, i.e., the start point of a transaction precedes its commit point.
2. for all i and j, if the scheduler chooses Tj’s start point after Ti ’s commit point, we have ci ≺t sj; otherwise, we
have bj ≺t ci.
Definition 24. Direct Serialization Graph. We define the direct serialization graph arising from a history H, denoted
DSG(H), as follows. Each node in DSG(H) corresponds to a committed transaction in H and directed edges correspond
to different types of direct conflicts. There is a read/write/anti-dependency edge from transaction Ti to transaction Tj if
Tj directly read/write/antidepends on Ti.
The model is augmented with a logical notion of time, used to define the start-ordered serialization graph.
Definition 25. Start-Depends. Tj start-depends on Ti if ci ≺t sj , i.e., if it starts after Ti commits. We write Ti b−→ Tj
Definition 26. Start-ordered Serialization Graph or SSG. For a history H, SSG(H) contains the same nodes and edges
as DSG(H) along with start-dependency edges.
The model introduces several phenomema, of which isolation levels proscribe a subset.
Definition 27. Phenomena:
G0: Write Cycles A history H exhibits phenomenon G0if DSG(H) contains a directed cycle consisting entirely of
write-dependency edges.
G1a: Dirty Reads A history H exhibits phenomenon G1a if it contains an aborted transaction Ti and a committed
transaction Tj such that Tj has read the same object (maybe via a predicate) modified by Ti.
G1b: Intermediate Reads A history H exhibits phenomenon G1b if it contains a committed transaction Tj that has
read a version of object x written by transaction Ti that was not Ti’s final modification of x.
G1c: Circular Information Flow A history H exhibits phenomenon G1cif DSG(H) contains a directed cycle consist-
ing entirely of dependency edges.
G2: Anti-dependency Cycles A history H exhibits phenomenon G2if DSG(H) contains a directed cycle having one or
more anti-dependency edges.
G-Single: Single Anti-dependency Cycles DSG(H) contains a directed cycle with exactly one anti-dependency edge.
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G-SIa: Interference A history H exhibits phenomenon G-SIa if SSG(H) contains a read/write-dependency edge from
Ti to Tj without there also being a start-dependency edge from Ti to Tj .
G-SIb: Missed Effects A history H exhibits phenomenon G-SIb if SSG(H) contains a directed cycle with exactly one
anti-dependency edge.
Definition 28. Isolations:
Serializability (PL-3) ¬G1 ∧ ¬G2
Read Committed (PL-2) ¬G1
Read Uncommitted (PL-1) ¬G0
Snapshot Isolation ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-SI
Appendix B State-based and cycle-based model equivalence
This section proves the following theorems:
Theorem 1. Let I be Serializability (SER). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T .CTSER(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G2.
Theorem 2. Let I be Snapshot Isolation (SI). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T .CTSI(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-SI
Theorem 3. Let I be Read Committed (RC). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T .CTRC(t, e) ≡ ¬G1
Appendix B.1 Serializability
Theorem 1. Let I be Serializability (SER). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T .CTSER(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G2.
Proof. We first prove ¬G1 ∧ ¬G2⇒ ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTSER(t, e).
Let H define a history over T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} and let DSG(H) be the corresponding direct serialization graph.
Together ¬G1c and ¬G2 state that the DSG(H) must not contain anti-dependency or dependency cycles: DSG(H) must
therefore be acyclic. Let i1, ...in be a permutation of 1, 2, ..., n such that ti1 , ..., tin is a topological sort of DSG(H)
(DSG(H) is acyclic and can thus be topologically sorted).
We construct an execution e according to the topological order defined above: e : s0 → sti1 → sti2 → ...→ stin
and show that ∀t ∈ T .CTSER(t, e). Specifically, we show that for all t = tij ,COMPLETEe,tij (stij−1 ) where stij−1
is the parent state of tij .
Consider the three possible types of operations in tij :
1. External Reads: an operation reads an object version that was created by another transaction.
2. Internal Reads: an operation reads an object version that itself created.
3. Writes: an operation creates a new object version.
We show that the parent state of tij is included in the read set of each of those operation types:
1. External Reads. Let rij (xik) read the version for x created by tik , where k 6= j.
We first show that stik
∗−→ stij−1 . As tij directly read-depends on tik , there must exist an edge tik
wr−−→ tij in
DSG(H), and tik must therefore be ordered before tij in the topological sort of DSG(H) (k < j). Given e
was constructed by applying every transaction in T in topological order, it follows that stik
∗−→ stij−1 .
Next, we argue that the state stij−1 contains the object-value pair (x, xik). Specifically, we show that there does
not exists a stil , where k < l < j, such that til writes a different version of x. We prove this by contradiction.
Consider the smallest such l: tij reads the version of x written by tik and til writes a different version of x. til , in
fact, writes the next version of x as e is constructed following ww dependencies: if there existed an intermediate
version of x, then either til was not the smallest transaction, or e does not respect ww dependencies. Note
that tij thus directly anti-depends on til , i.e. tij
rw−−→ til . As the topological sort of DSG(H) from which we
constructed e respects anti-dependencies, we finally have sij
∗−→ stil , i.e. j ≤ l, a contradiction. We conclude:
(x, xik) ∈ stij−1 , and therefore stij−1 ∈ RSe(rij (xik)).
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2. Internal Reads. Let rij (xij ) read xij such that w(xij )
to−→ r(xij ). By definition, the read state set of such
an operation consists of ∀s ∈ Se : s ∗−→ sp. Since stij−1 is tij ’s parent state, it trivially follows that stij−1 ∈
RSe(rij (xij )).
3. Writes. Let wij (xij ) be a write operation. By definition, its read state set consists of all the states before stij in
the execution. Hence it also trivially follows that stij−1 ∈ RSe(wij (xij )).
Thus stij−1 ∈
⋂
o∈Σtij
RSe(o). We have COMPLETEe,tij (stij−1 ) for any tij : ∀t ∈ T : CTSER(t, e).
(⇐) We next prove ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTSER(t, e)⇒ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G2.
To do so, we prove the contrapositive G1 ∨ G2 ⇒ ∀e ∃t ∈ T : ¬CTSER(t, e). Let H be a history that displays
phenomena G1 or G2. We generate a contradiction. Consider any execution e such that ∀t ∈ T : CTSER(t, e).
We first instantiate the version order for H , denoted as <<, as follows: given an execution e and an object x,
xi << xj if and only if x ∈ Wti ∩Wtj ∧ sti ∗−→ stj .
First, we show that:
Claim 1. ti → tj in DSG(H)⇒ sti ∗−→ stj in the execution e (i 6= j).
Proof. Consider the three edge types in DSG(H):
ti
ww−−→ tj There exists an object x s.t. xi << xj (version order). By construction, we have sti ∗−→ stj .
ti
wr−−→ tj There exists an object x s.t. tj reads version xi written by ti. Let stk be the parent state of stj , i.e.
stk → stj . By assumption CTSER(e, t) (t = tj), i.e. COMPLETEe,tj (stk), hence we have (x, xi) ∈ stk . For
the effects of ti to be visible in stk , ti must have been applied at an earlier point in the execution. Hence we
have: sti
∗−→ stk → stj .
ti
rw−−→ tj There exist an object x s.t. ti reads version xm written by tm, tj writes xj and xm << xj . By construction,
xm << xj implies stm
∗−→ stj . Let stk be the parent state of stj , i.e. stk → sti . As CTSER(e, t), where t = tj ,
holds by assumption, i.e. COMPLETEe,ti(stk), the key-value pair (x, xm) ∈ stk , hence stm ∗−→ stk as before.
In contrast, sti
∗−→ stj : indeed,(x, xm) ∈ stk and xm << xj . Hence, tj has not yet been applied. We thus have
stk −→ sti ∗−→ stj .
We now derive a contradiction in all cases of the disjunction G1 ∨ G2:
• Let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1a (aborted reads). There must exists events wi(xi), rj(xi) in H
such that ti subsequently aborted. T and any corresponding execution e, however, consists only of committed
transactions. Hence ∀e :6 ∃s ∈ Se, s.t. s ∈ RSe(rj(xi)): no complete state can exists for tj . There thus exists a
transaction for which the commit test cannot be satisfied, for any e. We have a contradiction.
• Let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1b (intermediate reads). In an execution e, only the final writes
of a transaction are applied. Hence,6 ∃s ∈ Se, s.t. s ∈ RSe(r(xintermediate)). There thus exists a transaction,
which for all e, will not satisfy the commit test. We once again have a contradiction.
• Finally, let us assume that the history H displays one or both phenomena G1c or G2. Any history that displays
G1c or G2 will contain a cycle in theDSG. Hence, there must exist a chain of transactions ti → ti+1 → ...→ tj
such that i = j in DSG(H). By Claim 1, we thus have sti
∗−→ sti+1 ∗−→ . . . ∗−→ stj for any e. By definition
however, a valid execution must be totally ordered. We have our final contradiction.
All cases generate a contradiction. We have G1 ∨ G2⇒ ∀e : ∃t ∈ T : ¬CTSER(e, t). This completes the proof.
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Appendix B.2 Snapshot Isolation
Theorem 2. Let I be Snapshot Isolation (SI). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T .CTSI(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-SI
Proof. We first prove ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-SI⇒ ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e).
LDG(H) properties To do so, we introduce the notion of logical order between transactions and capture this
relationship in a logic-order directed graph (LDG). This order refines the pre-existing start-order present in snapshot
isolation to include transitive observations. LDG(H) contains, as nodes, the set of committed transactions in H and
includes the following two edges:
• ti l1−→ tj iff ti sd−→ tj (and ti 6= tj). This is a simple renaming of the sd-edge, for clarity.
• ti l2−→ tj iff ∃tk : ti sd−→ tk rw−−→ tj . Intuitively, this edge captures the observation that if t1 is ordered before
t2 and t2’s reads entail that t2 is before t3, then t1 must be before t3. We note that, by construction ti 6= tj
(otherwise, the history H will display a G-SIb cycle).
Both l1 and l2 edges are transitive:
Claim 2. l1 edge is transitive: t1
l1−→ t2 l1−→ t3 ⇒ t1 l1−→ t3
Proof. We have t1
l1−→ t2 ⇔ t1 sd−→ t2 ⇔ c1 ≺t b2. By definition of ≺t, b2 ≺t c2. Hence, t1 l1−→ t2 ⇔ b2 ≺t c2.
Similarly, t2
l1−→ t3 ⇔ c2 ≺t b3. Consequently, we have c1 ≺t b2 ≺t c2 ≺t b3. By definition c1 ≺t b3 ⇒ t1 sd−→ t3 ⇒
t1
l1−→ t3. The proof is complete.
Claim 3. l2 edge is transitive: t1
l2−→ t2 l2−→ t3 ⇒ t1 l2−→ t3
Proof. By definition of l2, there must exist transactions t12, t23, such that t1
sd−→ t12 rw−−→ t2 and t2 sd−→ t23 rw−−→ t3.
Consider the path in SSG(H): t1
sd−→ t12 rw−−→ t2 sd−→ t23. We show that: t1 sd−→ t23. By definition, t1 sd−→ t12 ⇒
c1 ≺t b12 and t2 sd−→ t23 ⇒ c2 ≺t b23. By assumption, the history H does not contain an G-SIb cycle, there thus
cannot exists an edge t12
sd←− t2 as t2 either happens after or is concurrent with t12. In both cases, we have b12 ≺t c2.
The following relation thus hold: c1 ≺t b12 ≺t c2 ≺t b23. By definition, the edge t1 sd−→ t23 is therefore included in
the SSG(H), as is the path t1
sd−→ t23 rw−−→ t3. Hence, by construction, t1 l2−→ t3 exists in LDG(H). This completes
the proof.
Claim 4. t1
l2−→ t2 l1−→ t3 ⇒ t1 l1−→ t3.
Proof. If t1
l2−→ t2 l1−→ t3 exists in LDG(H), there must exist a transaction t12 such that t1 sd−→ t12 rw−−→ t2 sd−→ t3 in
SSG(H). By definition, t1
sd−→ t12 ⇒ c1 ≺t b12 and t2 sd−→ t3 ⇒ c2 ≺t b3. Moreover, by assumption, the history H
does not contain an G-SIb cycle; there thus cannot exists an edge t12
sd←− t2 as t2 either happens after or is concurrent
with t12. In both cases, we have b12 ≺t c2. Thus the following inequalities hold: c1 ≺t b12 ≺t c2 ≺t b3. By definition,
we thus have t1
l1−→ t3.
Finally, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. LDG(H) is acyclic if H disallows phenomena G1 and G-SI.
Proof. l1-edges First, we show that LDG(H) does not contain a cycle consisting only of l1 edges. l1 edges are
transitive (Claim 2). Hence any cycle consisting only of l1 edges will result in a self-loop, which we have argued is
impossible. Thus no such cycle can exist.
l2-edges Next, we show that LDG(H) does not contain a cycle consisting only of l2 edges. The proof proceeds as
above: l2 edges are transitive (Claim 3). Hence any cycle consisting of l2 edges only will result in a self-loop, which
we have argued is impossible. Thus no such cycle can exist.
l1/l2-edges Finally, we show that LDG(H) does not contain a cycle consisting of both l1 and l2 edges. We do this by
contradiction. Assume such a cycle cyc1 exists. It must contain the following sequence of transactions: t1
l2−→ t2 l1−→ t3
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in LDG(H). By Claim 4, there must exist an alternative cycle cyc2 containing the same set of edges as cyc1 but with
the edges t1
l2−→ t2 l1−→ t3 replaced by the edge t1 l1−→ t3. If t1 l2−→ t2 was the only l2 edge in cyc1, cyc2 is a cycle with
only l1 edges, which we previously proved could not arise. Otherwise, we apply the same reasoning, starting from cyc2,
and generate an equivalent cycle cyc3 consisting of one fewer l2 edge, until we obtain a cycle cycn with all n l2 edges
removed, and consisting only of l1 edges. In all cases, we generate a contradiction, and no cycle consisting of both l1
and l2 edges can exist. This concludes the proof.
Commit Test Armed with an acyclic LDG(H), we can construct an execution e such that every committed
transaction satisfies the commit test CTSI(e, t). Let i1, ...in be a permutation of 1, 2, ..., n such that ti1 , ..., tin
is a topological sort of LDG(H) (LDG(H) is acyclic and can thus be topologically sorted). We construct an
execution e according to the topological order defined above: e : s0 → sti1 → sti2 → ... → stin and show
that ∀t ∈ T .CTSI(t, e). Specifically, we prove the following: let there be a largest k such that tik l1−→ tij , then
COMPLETEe,tij (stik ) ∧ (∆(stik , stij−1 ) ∩Wstij = ∅).
Complete State We first prove that COMPLETEe,tij (stik ). Consider the three possible types of operations in tij :
1. External Reads: an operation reads an object version that was created by another transaction.
2. Internal Reads: an operation reads an object version that itself created.
3. Writes: an operation creates a new object version.
We show that the stik is included in the read set of each of those operation types:
1. External Reads. Let rij (xiq ) read the version for x created by tiq , where q 6= j.
We first show that stik
∗−→ stiq . As tij directly read-depends on tiq , there must exist an edge tiq
wr−−→ tij
in SSG(H). Given that H disallows phenomenon G-SIa by assumption, there must therefore exist a start-
dependency edge tiq
sd−→ tij in SSG(H). LDG(H) will consequently contain the following edge: tiq l1−→ tij .
Given e was constructioned by applying every transaction T in topological order, and that we select the largest k
such that tik
l1−→ tij , it follows that q ≤ k < j and siq ∗−→ sik +−→ sij
Next, we argue that the state stik contains the object value pair (x, xiq ). Specifically, we argue that there does
not exist a stim , where q < m ≤ k, such that tim writes a new version of x. We prove this by contradiction.
Consider the smallest such m: tik reads the version of x written by tiq and tim writes the next version of x.
tij thus directly anti-depends on tim— i.e., tij
rw−−→ tim . In addition, it holds by assumption that tik l1−→ tij .
Hence, the following sequence of eddges exists in SSG(H): tik
sd−→ tij rw−−→ tim . Equivalently, LDG(H)
will contain the edge tik
l2−→ tim . As the topological sort of LDG(H) from which we constructed e respects
l2 edges, we finally have sik
+−→ sim (k < m), a contradiction. We conclude: (x, xiq ) ∈ stik and therefore
stik ∈ RSe(rij (xiq )).
2. Internal Reads. Let rij (xij ) read xij such that w(xij )
to−→ r(xij ). By definition, the read state set of such an
operation consists of ∀s ∈ Se : s ∗−→ sp. Since stik is precedes stij in the topological order (tik l1-precedes tij
and e respects l1 edges) , it trivially follows that stik ∈ RSe(rij (xij )).
3. Writes. Let wij (xij ) be a write operation. By definition, its read state set consists of all the states before stij in
the execution. Hence it also trivially follows that stik ∈ RSe(wij (xij )).
Thus stik ∈
⋂
o∈Σtij
RSe(o).
Distinct Write Sets We now prove the second half of the commit test: (∆(stik , stij−1 ) ∩Wstij = ∅) We prove this
by contradiction. Consider the largest m, where k < m < j such thatWstim ∩Wstij 6= ∅. tim thus directly write-
depends on tij , i.e. tim
ww−−→ tij . By assumption, H proscribes phenomenon G-SIa. Hence, there must exist an edge
tim
sd−→ tij in SSG(H), and equivalently tim l1−→ tij in LDG(H). As e respects the topological order of LDG(H),
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it follows that sim
+−→ sij (m < j). By assumption however, tik is the latest transaction in e such that tik l1−→ tij , so
m ≤ k. Since we had assumed that k < m < j, we have a contradiction. Thus, ∀m, k < m < j,Wstim ∩Wstij = ∅.
We conclude that ∆(stik , stij−1 ) ∩Wstij = ∅
We have COMPLETEe,tij (stik ) ∧(∆(stik , stij−1 ) ∩Wstij = ∅) for any tij : ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e).
(⇐) We next prove ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-SI.
Let e be an execution such that ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e), and H be a history for committed transactions T . We first
instantiate the version order for H , denoted as <<, as follows: given an execution e and an object x, xi << xj if and
only if x ∈ Wti ∩Wtj ∧sti ∗−→ stj . It follows that, for any two states such that (x, xi) ∈ tim ∧ (x, xj) ∈ tin ⇒ stm +−→
stn . We next assign the start and commit points of each transaction. We assume the existence of a monotonically
increasing timestamp counter: if a transaction ti requests a timestamp ts, and a transaction tj subsequently requests a
timestamp ts′, then ts < ts′. Writing e as s0 → st1 → st2 → · · · → stn , our timestamp assignment logic is then the
following:
1. Let i = 0.
2. Set s = sti ; if i = 0, s = s0.
3. Assign a commit timestamp to tsi if i 6= 0.
4. Assign a start timestamp to all transactions tk such that tk satisfies
COMPLETEe,tk(s) ∧ (∆(s, sp(tk)) ∩Wstk = ∅) and tk does not already have a start timestamp.
5. Let i = i+ 1. Repeat 1-4 until the final state in e is reached.
We can relate the history’s start-dependency order and execution order as follows:
Claim 5. ∀ti, tj ∈ T : stj ∗−→ sti ⇒ ¬ti sd−→ tj
Proof. We have ti
sd−→ tj ⇒ ci ≺t bj by definition. Moreover, the start point of a transaction ti is always assigned
before its commit point. Hence: ci ≺t bj ≺t cj . It follows from our timestamp assignment logic that sti +−→ stj . We
conclude: ti
sd−→ tj ⇒ sti +−→ stj . Taking the contrapositive of this implication completes the proof.
G1 We first prove that: ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G1. We do so by contradiction.
G1a Let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1a (aborted reads). There must exist events wi(xi), rj(xi) in
H such that ti subsequently aborted. T and any corresponding execution e, however, consists only of committed
transactions. Hence ∀e :6 ∃s ∈ Se : s ∈ RSe(rj(xi)): no complete state can exists for tj . There thus exists a transaction
for which the commit test cannot be satisfied, for any e. We have a contradiction.
G1b Let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1b (intermediate reads). In an execution e, only the final writes of
a transaction are applied. Hence, 6 ∃s ∈ Se : s ∈ RSe(r(xintermediate)). There thus exists a transaction, which for all
e, will not satisfy the commit test. We once again have a contradiction.
G1c Finally, let us assume thatH exhibits phenomenon G1c: SSG(H) must contain a cycle of read/write dependencies.
We consider each possible edge in the cycle in turn:
• ti ww−−→ tj There must exist an object x such that xi << xj (version order). By construction, version in H is
consistent with the execution order e: we have sti
∗−→ stj .
• ti wr−−→ tj There must exist a read rj(xi) ∈ Σtj such that tj reads version xi written by ti. By assumption,
CTSI(e, tj) holds. There must therefore exists a state stk ∈ Se such that COMPLETEe,tj (stk). If stk is a
complete state for tj , stk ∈ RSe(rj(xi)) and (x, xi) ∈ stk . For the effects of ti to be visible in stk , ti must
have been applied at an earlier point in the execution. Hence we have: sti
∗−→ stk . Moreover, by definition of the
candidate read states, stk
∗−→ sp(tj) −→ stj (Definition 2). It follows that sti ∗−→ stj .
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If a history H displays phenomenon G1c, there must exist a chain of transactions ti → ti+1 → ...→ tj such that i = j.
A corresponding cycle must thus exist in the execution e sti
∗−→ sti+1 ∗−→ . . . ∗−→ stj . By definition however, a valid
execution must be totally ordered. We once again have a contradiction.
We generate a contradiction in all cases of the disjunction: we conclude that the historyH cannot display phenomenon
G1.
G-SI We now prove that ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G-SI.
G-SIa We first show that G-SIa cannot happen for both write-write dependencies and write-read dependencies:
• ti wr−−→ tj There must exist an object x such that tj reads version xi written by ti. Let stk be the first state in
e such that COMPLETEe,tj (stk) ∧ (∆(stk , sp(tj)) ∩ Wstj = ∅). Such a state must exist since CTSI(e, tj)
holds by assumption. As stk is complete, we have (x, xi) ∈ stk . For the effects of ti to be visible in stk , ti
must have been applied at an earlier point in the execution. Hence we have: sti
∗−→ stk ∗−→ stj . It follows
from our timestamp assignment logic that ci t ck. Similarly, the start point of tj must have been assigned
after tk’s commit point (as stk is tj’s earliest complete state), hence ck ≺t sj . Combining the two inequalities
results in ci ≺t sj : there will exist a start-dependency edge ti sd−→ tj . H will not display G-SIa for write-read
dependencies.
• ti ww−−→ tj There must exist an object x such that tj writes the version xj that follows xi. By construc-
tion, it follows that sti
∗−→ stj . Let stk be the first state in the execution such that COMPLETEe,tj (stk) ∧
(∆(stk , sp(tj)) ∩Wtj = ∅). We first show that: sti ∗−→ stk . Assume by way of contradiction that stk +−→ sti .
The existence of a write-write dependency between ti and tj implies thatWti ∩Wtj 6= ∅, and consequently,
that ∆(stk , sp(tj)) ∩Wtj 6= ∅, contradicting our assumption that CTSI(e, tj). We conclude that: sti ∗−→ stk .
It follows from our timestamp assignment logic that ci t ck. Similarly, the start point of tij must have been
assigned after tk’s commit point (as stk is tj’s earliest complete state), hence ck ≺t sj . Combining the two
inequalities results in ci ≺t sj : there will exist a start-dependency edge ti sd−→ tj . H will not display G-SIafor
write-write dependencies.
The history H will thus not display phenomenon G-SIa.
G-SIb We next prove that H will not display phenomenon G-SIb. Our previous result states that H proscribes
G-SIa: all read-write dependency edges between two transactions implies the existence of a start dependency edge
between those same transactions. We prove by contradiction that H proscribes G-SIb. Assume that SSG(H) consists
of a directed cycle cyc1 with exactly one anti-dependency edge (it displays G-SIb) but proscribes G-SIa. All other
dependencies will therefore be write/write dependencies, write/read dependencies, or start-depend edges. By G-SIa,
there must exist an equivalent cycle cyc2 consisting of a directed cycle with exactly one anti-dependency edge
and start-depend edges only. Start-edges are transitive (Claim 2), hence there must exist a cycle cyc3 with exactly
one anti-dependency edge and one start-depend edge. We write ti
rw−−→ tj sd−→ ti. Given ti rw−−→ tj , there must
exist an object x and transaction tm such that tm writes xm, ti reads xm and tj writes the next version of x, xj
(xm << xj). Let stk be the earliest complete state of ti. Such a state must exist as CTSI(e, ti) by assumption. Hence,
by definition of read state (x, xm) ∈ stk . Similarly, (x, xj) ∈ stj by the definition of state transition (Definition 1). By
construction, we have stk
+−→ stj . Our timestamp assignment logic maintains the following invariant: given a state
st, ∀tk : COMPLETEe,tk(st) : ∀stn : st +−→ stn ⇒ bk ≺t cn. Intuitively, the start timestamp of all transactions
associated with a particular complete state st is smaller than the commit timestamp of any transaction that follows st
in the execution. We previously showed that stk
+−→ stj . Given stk is a complete state for ti, we conclude bi ≺t cj .
However, the edge tj
sd−→ ti implies that cj ≺t bi. We have a contradiction: no such cycle can exist and H will not
display phenomenon G-SI.
We generate a contradiction in all cases of the conjunction, hence ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G-SI holds.
We conclude ∀t ∈ T : CTSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G-SI ∧ G1. This completes the proof.
Appendix B.3 Read Committed
Theorem 3. Let I be Read Committed (RC). Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T .CTRC(t, e) ≡ ¬G1.
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Proof. We first prove ¬G1⇒ ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTRC(t, e).
Let H define a history over T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} and let DSG(H) be the corresponding direct serialization graph.
¬G1c states that the DSG(H) must not contain dependency cycles: the subgraph of DSG(H), SDSG(H) containing
the same nodes but including only dependency edges, must be acyclic. Let i1, ...in be a permutation of 1, 2, ..., n such
that ti1 , ..., tin is a topological sort of SDSG(H) (SDSG(H) is acyclic and can thus be topologically sorted).
We construct an execution e according to the topological order defined above: e : s0 → sti1 → sti2 → ...→ stin
and show that ∀t ∈ T .CTRC(t, e). Specifically, we show that for all t = tij , PREREADe(t).
Consider the three possible types of operations in tij :
1. External Reads: an operation reads an object version that was created by another transaction.
2. Internal Reads: an operation reads an object version that itself created.
3. Writes: an operation creates a new object version.
We show that the read set for each of operation type is not empty:
1. External Reads. Let rij (xik) read the version for x created by tik , where k 6= j.
We first show that stik
∗−→ stij . As tij directly read-depends on tik , there must exist an edge tik
wr−−→ tij in
SDSG(H), and tik must therefore be ordered before tij in the topological sort of SDSG(H) (k < j), it follows
that stik
+−→ stij . As (x, xik) ∈ stik , we have stik ∈ RSe(rij (xik)), and consequentlyRSe(rij (xik)) 6= ∅.
2. Internal Reads. Let rij (xij ) read xij such that w(xij )
to−→ r(xij ). By definition, the read state set of such
an operation consists of ∀s ∈ Se : s ∗−→ sp. s0 ∗−→ s trivially holds. We conclude s0 ∈ RSe(rij (xij )), i.e.
RSe(rij (xij )) 6= ∅.
3. Writes. Let wij (xij ) be a write operation. By definition, its read state set consists of all the states before stij in
the execution. Hence s0 ∈ RSe(rij (xij )), i.e. RSe(rij (xij )) 6= ∅.
Thus ∀o ∈ Σt : RSe(o) 6= ∅. We have PREREADe(tij ) for any tij : ∀t ∈ T : CTRC(t, e).
(⇐) We next prove ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTRC(t, e)⇒ ¬G1.
To do so, we prove the contrapositive G1⇒ ∀e ∃t ∈ T : ¬CTRC(t, e). Let H be a history that displays phenomena
G1. We generate a contradiction. Assume that there exists an execution e such that ∀t ∈ T : CTRC(t, e).
We first instantiate the version order for H , denoted as <<, as follows: given an execution e and an object x,
xi << xj if and only if x ∈ Wti ∩Wtj ∧ sti +−→ stj .
First, we show that:
Claim 6. ti → tj in SDSG(H)⇒ sti +−→ stj in the execution e (i 6= j).
Proof. Consider the three edge types in DSG(H):
ti
ww−−→ tj There exists an object x s.t. xi << xj (version order). By construction, we have sti +−→ stj .
ti
wr−−→ tj There exists an object x s.t. tj reads version xi written by ti, i.e. rj(x, xi) ∈ Σti . By assumption
CTRC(e, t) (t = tj), i.e. PREREADe(tj), RSe(o) 6= ∅. Let s ∈ RSe(o), by definition of RSe(o), we have
(x, xi) ∈ s ∧ s +−→ stj , therefore ti must be applied before or on state s, hence we have sti ∗−→ s +−→ stj , i.e.
sti
+−→ stj .
We now derive a contradiction in all cases of G1:
• Let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1a (aborted reads). There must exists events wi(xi), rj(xi) in H
such that ti subsequently aborted. T and any corresponding execution e, however, consists only of committed
transactions. Hence ∀e :6 ∃s ∈ Se, s.t. s ∈ RSe(rj(xi)): no complete state can exists for tj . There thus exists a
transaction for which the commit test cannot be satisfied, for any e. We have a contradiction.
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• Let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1b (intermediate reads). In an execution e, only the final writes
of a transaction are applied. Hence,6 ∃s ∈ Se, s.t. s ∈ RSe(r(xintermediate)). There thus exists a transaction,
which for all e, will not satisfy the commit test. We once again have a contradiction.
• Finally, let us assume that the history H displays G1c. Any history that displays G1cwill contain a cycle in the
SDSG(H). Hence, there must exist a chain of transactions ti → ti+1 → ...→ tj such that i = j. By Claim 6, we
thus have sti
+−→ sti+1 +−→ . . . +−→ stj , i = j for any e. By definition however, a valid execution must be totally
ordered. We have our final contradiction.
All cases generate a contradiction. We have G1⇒ ∀e : ∃t ∈ T : ¬CTRC(e, t). This completes the proof.
Appendix C Causality and Session Guarantees
We prove the following theorems:
Theorem 7 Let G = {RMW,MR,MW,WFR}, then
∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONG(se, t, e) ≡ ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONCC(se, t, e)
We first state a number of useful lemmas about the PREREADe(T ) predicate (Definition 3): if PREREADe(T )
holds, then the candidate read set of all operations in all transactions in T is not empty. The first lemma states that an
operation’s read state must reflect writes that took place before the transaction committed, while the second lemma
simply argues that the predicate is closed under subset.
Lemma 2. For any T ′ such that T ′ ⊆ T , PREREADe(T ′)⇔ ∀t ∈ T ′ : ∀o ∈ Σt : sfo +−→ st.
Proof. (⇒) We first prove PREREADe(T ′)⇒ ∀t ∈ T ′ : ∀o ∈ Σt : sfo +−→ st.
By the definition of PREREADe(T ′), we have ∀t ∈ T ′,∀o ∈ Σt, RSe(o) 6= ∅. We consider the two types of
operations: reads and writes.
Reads The set of candidate read states of a read operation o = r(k, v) is defined as RSe(o) = {s ∈ Se|s ∗−→
sp ∧
(
(k, v) ∈ s ∨ (∃w(k, v) ∈ Σt : w(k, v) to−→ r(k, v))
)}. The disjunction considers two cases:
1. Internal Reads if ∃w(k, v) ∈ Σt : w(k, v) to−→ r(k, v), RSe(o) = {s ∈ Se|s ∗−→ sp}. Hence s0 ∈ RSe(o).
It follows that sfo = s0
+−→ st
2. External Reads By PREREADe(T ′), we have thatRSe(o) 6= ∅. There must therefore exist a state s ∈ Se
such that s ∗−→ sp ∧ (k, v) ∈ s. Since sfo is, by definition, the first such s, we have that sfo ∗−→ sp → st. We
conclude: sfo
+−→ st.
Writes The candidate read states set for write operations o = w(k, v), is defined asRSe(o) = {s ∈ Se|s ∗−→ sp}.
Hence, s0 ∈ RSe(o). It trivially follows that (sfo = s0) +−→ st.
We conclude: PREREADe(T ′)⇒ ∀t ∈ T ′ : ∀o ∈ Σt : sfo +−→ st.
(⇐) Next, we prove that PREREADe(T ′)⇐ ∀t ∈ T ′ : ∀o ∈ Σt : sfo +−→ st.
By assumption, ∀t ∈ T ′ : ∀o ∈ Σt : sfo +−→ st. By definition, sfo ∈ RSe(o). It trivially follows that
∀t ∈ T ′ : ∀o ∈ Σt : RSe(o) 6= ∅, i.e. PREREADe(T ′) holds.
Lemma 3. For any T ′ that T ′ ⊆ T , PREREADe(T )⇒ PREREADe(T ′).
Proof. Given PREREADe(T ), by definition we have ∀t ∈ T ,∀o ∈ Σt, RSe(o) 6= ∅. Since T ′ ⊆ T , ∀t ∈ T ′ ⇒
∀t ∈ T , it follows that ∀t ∈ T ′,∀o ∈ Σt,RSe(o) 6= ∅, i.e. PREREADe(T ′).
We now begin in earnest our proof of Theorem 7.
(⇐) We first prove that ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONCC(se, t, e) ⇒ ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse :
SESSIONG(se, t, e).
For any se ∈ SE, consider the execution e, such that ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONCC(se, t, e). We show that this same
execution satisfies the session test of all four session guarantees.
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• CC⇒ RMW: By assumption, SESSIONCC(se, t, e) for all Tse. Hence: ∀t ∈ Tse : ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : st′ ∗−→
slo. Weakening this statement gives the following implication: ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : Wt′ 6= ∅ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo.
Additionally, e satisfies PREREADe(T ) (by assumption) and therefore PREREADe(Tse) as Tse ⊆ T (by
Lemma 3). Putting it all together: e satisfies PREREADe(Tse) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t :Wt′ 6= ∅ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo.
We conclude that ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONRMW (se, t, e).
• CC⇒MW: By assumption, SESSIONCC(se, t, e) for all t ∈ Tse. Hence, it holds that ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→
tj : sti
+−→ stj . Weakening this statement gives the following implication: ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀t′i se
′
−−→ tj :
(Wti 6= ∅ ∧Wtj 6= ∅)⇒ sti +−→ stj . Additionally, e satisfies PREREADe(T ) (by assumption) and therefore
PREREADe(Tse) as Tse ⊆ T (by Lemma 3). Putting it all together: PREREADe(Tse)∧∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀t′i se
′
−−→
tj : (Wti 6= ∅ ∧Wtj 6= ∅)⇒ sti +−→ stj .
We conclude that ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMW (se, t, e).
• CC⇒MR: By assumption, SESSIONCC(se, t, e), hence e ensures that ∀t ∈ Tse : ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : st′ ∗−→
slo. Moreover, by assumption, we have that PREREADe(T ). It follows that ∀t′ ∈ T : ∀o′ ∈ Σt′ : sfo′ +−→ st′
(Lemma 2). Combining the two statements, we have ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : ∀o′ ∈ Σt′ : sfo′ ∗−→ st′ ∗−→ slo, i.e.
sfo′
∗−→ slo. Finally, we have that e satisfies IRCe(t) by assumption, and PREREADe(Tse) by Lemma 3: we
have PREREADe(T ) and Tse ⊆ T . Putting it all together, e satisfies PREREADe(Tse)∧ IRCe(t)∧∀o ∈ Σt :
∀t′ se−→ t : ∀o′ ∈ Σt′ : sfo′ ∗−→ slo.
We conclude that ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMR(se, t, e).
• CC⇒WFR: By assumption, SESSIONCC(se, t, e). Hence e satisfies ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj .
By assumption, e respects PREREADe(T ). It follows from lemma 2 that ∀ti ∈ T : ∀oi ∈ Σti : sfoi +−→ sti .
We have, by combining these two statements, that: ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : ∀oi ∈ Σti : sfoi +−→ sti +−→ stj ,
i.e. sfoi
+−→ stj . Weakening this statement results in the following implication: ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : ∀oi ∈
Σti : Wtj 6= ∅ ⇒ sfoi +−→ stj . Putting it all together, e satisfies PREREADe(T ) ∧ ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj :
∀oi ∈ Σti :Wtj 6= ∅ ⇒ sfoi +−→ stj .
We conclude that ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONWFR(se, t, e).
(⇒) We now prove that, given G = {RMW,MR,MW,WFR}, the following implication holds: ∀se ∈ SE :
∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONG(se, t, e)⇒ ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONCC(se, t, e).
To this end, we prove that for any session se, given the execution e such that ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONG(se, t, e), we can
construct an equivalent execution e′ that satisfies all four session guarantees, such that ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONCC(se, t, e’).
The need for constructing an alternative but equivalent execution e′ may be counter-intuitive at first. We motivate it
informally here: session guarantees place no requirements on the commit order of read-only transactions. In contrast,
causal consistency requires all transactions to commit in session order. As read-only transactions have no effect on the
candidate read states of other read-only or update transactions, it is therefore always possible to generate an equivalent
execution e′ such that update transactions commit in the same order as in e, and read-only transactions commit in
session order. Our proof shows that, if e satisfies all four session guarantees, e′ will satisfy all four session guarantees.
This will in turn imply that e′ satisfies causal consistency.
Equivalent Execution We now describe more formally how to construct this execution e′: first, we apply in e′ all
transactions t ∈ T such thatWt 6= ∅, respecting their commit order in e. We denote the states created by applying
t in e and e′ as se,t and se′,t respectively. Our construction enforces the following relationship between e and e′:
∀t ∈ T ∧Wt 6= ∅ : (k, v) ∈ se,t ⇔ (k, v) ∈ se′,t. All update transactions are applied in the same order, and read-only
transactions have no effect on the state. Next, we consider the read-only transactions ti ∈ T in session order: we select
the parent state for ti to be max{maxo∈Σti{sfo}, sti−1}, where ti−1 denotes the transaction that directly precedes t in
a session. A session defines a total order of transactions: ti−1 is unique. If ti is the first transaction in the session, we
simply set sti−1 to s0. As transactions do not change the value of states, this process maintains the previously stated
invariant: ∀t ∈ T ∧Wt 6= ∅ : se,t ≡ se′,t.
We now proceed to prove that e′ satisfies PREREADe′(T ) and the session test for all session guarantees.
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Preread First, we show that PREREADe′(T ) holds. We distinguish between update and read-only transactions:
• Read-Only Transactions. By construction, the parent state of a read-only transaction ti is sp(ti) =
max{maxo∈Σt{sfo}, sti−1}. It follows that ∀o ∈ Σt, sp(t) ≥ sfo and consequently sfo ∗−→ sp(t) → st.
We have ∀o ∈ Σt : sfo +−→ st in e′.
• Update Transactions. Update transactions t consist of both read and write operations. A write operation
o = w(k, v) ∈ Σt has for candidate read set the set of all states s ∈ Se′ such that s ∗−→ sp(t). Hence
sfo = s0 and sfo
+−→ st in e′ trivially holds. The state corresponding to sfo for read operations o = r(xi)
is the state created by the transaction ti that wrote version xi of object x: sfo = se′,ti . By assumption, e
satisfies PREREADe(T ), hence by Lemma 2, we have sti +−→ st in e. By construction (update transactions
are applied in e′ in the same order as e), it follows that sti
+−→ st in e′, i.e. sfo +−→ st in e′.
By Lemma 2, we conclude that PREREADe′(T ) holds.
MW We next show that e′ satisfies SESSIONMW (se, t, e’) for all sessions se ∈ SE and ∀t ∈ Tse. Consider
any session se′ and two transactions ti, tj ∈ Tse′ such that ti se
′
−−→ tj , and Wti 6= ∅ ∧ Wtj 6= ∅. As e, by
assumption, satisfies ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMW (se, t, e), we have se,ti +−→ se,tj . Since ti and tj are update
transactions, they are applied in the same order in e′ as in e: hence, se′,ti
+−→ se′,tj . Further, recall that we
previously showed that PREREADe′(T ) (and consequently PREREADe′(Tse) by Lemma 3).
Putting it all together, we conclude that PREREADe′(Tse) ∧ ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : (Wti 6= ∅ ∧Wtj 6=
∅)⇒ sti +−→ stj , i.e., ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMW (se, t, e’).
WFR Consider all update transactions such that ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : ∀oi ∈ Σti : Wtj 6= ∅. We prove
that sfoi
+−→ stj . Consider the two types of operations that arise in an update transaction:
• Reads. The state corresponding to sfoi for read operations o = ri(x, xk) is the state created by the
transaction tk that wrote version xk of object x: sfoi = stk . By assumption, e satisfies ∀t ∈ Tse :
SESSIONWFR(se, t, e), we have sfoi
+−→ stj in e, i.e. stk +−→ stj in e. Since we apply update transactions
in e′ the same order as in e, it follows that stk
+−→ stj in e′, i.e., sfoi +−→ stj in e′.
• Writes. The candidate read states set for write operations o = w(xi), is defined asRSe(o) = {s ∈ Se|s ∗−→
sp}. It trivially follows that sfo = s0 +−→ st.
We conclude: ∀se ∈ SE : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONWFR(se, t, e’).
Before proving that the remaining session guarantees hold, we prove an intermediate result:
Claim 7. ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj . Intuitively, all transactions commit in session order.
Proof. We first prove this result for update transactions, then generalise it to all transactions.
Update Transactions For a given session se′, let Tu be the set of all update transactions in Tse′ , and let tj
be an arbitrary transaction in Tu. It thus holds that tj ∈ Tse′ ∧Wtj 6= ∅. We associate with each such tj two
further sets: Tpreu and Tprer . Tpreu contains all update transactions ti such that ti
se′−−→ tj . Similarly, Tprer
contains all read-only transactions ti such that ti
se′−−→ tj .Tpre is the union of those two sets. We prove that
∀ti ∈ Tpre : sti +−→ stj . If ti ∈ Tpreu , henceWi 6= ∅∧Wj 6= ∅, the result trivially follows from monotonic writes.
We previously proved that ∀t ∈ Tse′ : SESSIONMW (se’, t, e’). As such, the conjunctionWi 6= ∅ ∧ Wj 6= ∅
implies sti
+−→ stj in e′.
The proof is more complex if ti ∈ Tprer (read-only transaction). We proceed by induction:
26
Base Case Consider the first read-only transaction ti ∈ Tprer according to the session order se′. This
transaction is unique (sessions totally order transactions). Recall that we choose the parent state of a read-
only transaction as sp(ti) = max{maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}, sti−1}, where ti−1 denotes the transaction that directly
precedes ti in session se′ (sti−1 = s0 if ti is the first transaction in the session). Hence, ti’s parent state is either
sp(ti) = maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}, or sp(ti) = sti−1
1. If sp(ti) = maxoi∈Σti {sfoi}: We previously proved that ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONWFR(se, t, e’). It
follows that ∀oi ∈ Σti : sfoi +−→ stj in e′ and consequently, maxoi∈Σti {sfoi}
+−→ stj in e′. Given
that sp(ti) = maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}, the following then holds sp(ti)
+−→ stj in e′. Finally, we note that, by
definition (Definition 1), the parent state of a transaction directly precede its commit state. We can thus
rephrase the aforementioned relationship as sp(ti) → sti ∗−→ stj in e′, concluding the proof for this
subcase.
2. If sp(ti) = sti−1 : We defined ti to be the first read-only transaction in the session. Given that, by
construction ti−1
se′−−→ ti, ti−1 is necessarily an update transaction, where Wti−1 6= ∅. Consider the
pair of transactions (ti−1, tj). The session order is transitive, hence ti−1
se′−−→ tj given that ti−1 se
′
−−→ ti
and ti
se′−−→ tj both hold. By construction, we haveWti−1 6= ∅ ∧ Wtj 6= ∅. We previously proved that
∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMW (se, t, e’). Hence, ifWti−1 6= ∅ ∧ Wtj 6= ∅, it follows that sti−1 +−→ stj . As
above, we conclude that: sp(ti)
+−→ stj in e′, and finally sp(ti)→ sti ∗−→ stj .
To complete the base case, we note that ti 6= tj as ti se
′
−−→ tj . We conclude: sti +−→ stj .
Induction Step Consider the k-th read-only transaction ti in se′ such that ti
se′−−→ tj . We assume that it satisfies
the induction hypothesis sti
+−→ stj . Now consider the (k+1)-th read-only transaction ti′ in se′, such that ti′ se
′
−−→ tj .
By construction, we once again distinguish two cases: ti′’s parent state is either sp(ti′) = maxoi′∈Σt′
i
{sfo′i}, or
sp(ti′) = sti′−1 , where ti′−1 denotes the transaction directly preceding ti′ in a session.
1. If sp(ti′) = maxoi′∈Σti′ {sfo′i}: We previously proved that ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONWFR(se, t, e’). It
follows that ∀oi′ ∈ Σti′ : sfoi′
+−→ stj in e′ and consequently, maxoi′ ∈ Σti′{sfoi′}
+−→ stj in e′. Given
that sp(ti′) = maxoi′∈Σti′ {sfoi′}, the following then holds sp(ti′)
+−→ stj in e′. Finally, we note that, by
definition (Definition 1), the parent state of a transaction must directly precede its commit state. We can
thus rephrase the aforementioned relationship as sp(ti′)→ sti′
∗−→ stj in e′, concluding the proof for this
subcase.
2. If sp(ti′) = sti′−1 : First, we note that ti′−1
se′−−→ tj holds, as the session order is transitive and we have
both ti′−1
se′−−→ ti′ and ti′ se
′
−−→ tj . We then distinguish between two cases: ti′−1 is an update transaction,
and ti′−1 is a read only transaction. If ti′−1 is an update transaction, the following conjunction holds:
Wti′−1 6= ∅ ∧ Wtj 6= ∅. Given that we previously proved ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMW (se, t, e’) , we can
infer that sti′−1
+−→ stj , i.e. sp(ti′) +−→ stj in e′. We again note that by definition (Definition 1), the parent
state of a transaction must directly precede its commit state. We can thus rephrase the aforementioned
relationship as sp(ti′)→ sti′
∗−→ stj in e′. We now consider the case where ti′−1 is a read-only transaction.
If ti′ is the k+1-th read-only transaction, then, by construction ti′−1 is the k-th read-only transaction. Hence
ti = ti′−1 = sp(ti′). Our induction hypothesis states that sti
+−→ stj . It thus follows that sp(ti′) +−→ stj in
e′. As previously, we conclude that: sp(ti)→ sti ∗−→ stj in e′.
To complete the induction step, we note that t′i 6= tj as t′i se
′
−−→ tj . We conclude: st′i
+−→ stj .
We proved the desired result for both the base case and induction step. By induction, we conclude that: given
any tj such thatWtj 6= ∅,and any read-only transactions ti such that ti se
′
−−→ tj , sti +−→ stj holds.
We conclude that given any tj such thatWtj 6= ∅, and any transaction ti such that ti se
′
−−→ tj , sti +−→ stj holds.
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Read-Only Transactions We now generalise the result to both update and read-only transactions. Specifically,
we prove that in e′, ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj . We first prove this statement for any two consecutive transactions
in a session, and then extend it to all transactions in a session. Consider any two pair of transactions ti,ti−1 in
Tse′ such that ti−1 directly precede ti in se′ (ti−1 se
′
−−→ ti). IfWti 6= ∅, sti−1 +−→ sti as proven above. If ti is a
read-only transaction, its parent state, by construction, is equal to sp(ti) = max{maxoi∈Σti {sfoi}, sti−1}. Since
max{maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}, sti−1} ≥ sti−1 by definition, it follows that sti−1
∗−→ sp(ti). As sp(ti)→ sti , it follows
that sti−1
+−→ sti . Together each such pair of consecutive transactions ti−1, ti defines a sequence: t1 se
′
−−→ t2 se
′
−−→
. . .
se′−−→ tk, where Tse′ = {t1, . . . , tk}. From the implication derived in the previous paragraph, it follows that
st1
+−→ st2 +−→ . . . +−→ stk . Noting that session order is transitive, we conclude: ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj .
This completes the proof of Claim 7.
RMW We now return to session guarantees and prove that ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONRMW (se, t, e’). Specifically,
we show that PREREADe′(Tse) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t :Wt′ 6= ∅ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo.
We proceed to prove that each of the two clauses holds true.
By assumption, e guarantees read-my-writes: ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONRMW (se, t, e). Consider an arbitrary
transaction t, and all update transactions t′ that precede t in the session: ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : Wt′ 6= ∅. We
distinguish between read operations and write operations:
• Let o be a read operation o = r(k, v). Its candidate read set isRSe′(o) = {s ∈ Se|s ∗−→ sp(t) ∧
(
(k, v) ∈
s ∨ (∃w(k, v) ∈ Σt : w(k, v) to−→ r(k, v))
)}. slo, the last state in RSe′(o) can have one of two values:
slo = sp(t), disallowing states created after t’s commit point, or slo = sp(tˆ), where tˆ is the update
transaction that writes the next version of k.
– slo = sp(t). We previously proved that ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj . By construction,
t′ se−→ t. It follows that st′ +−→ st and consequently that st′ ∗−→ sp(t). Given sp(t) = slo, we
conclude: st′
∗−→ slo.
– slo = sp(tˆ). Consider first the relationships between read states and commit states in e. By
assumption, e satisfies ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONRMW (se, t, e), i.e. st′ ∗−→ slo in e. Since tˆ wrote the
next version of the object that t read, we have that slo
∗−→ sp(tˆ) +−→ stˆ in e. Combining the guarantee
given by read-my-writes st′
∗−→ slo and slo +−→ stˆ, we obtain st′ +−→ stˆ in e. Returning to the
execution e′, since t′ and tˆ are both update transactions,Wt′ 6= ∅ ∧Wtˆ 6= ∅, if st′ +−→ stˆ in e, then
st′
+−→ stˆ in e′. Given e′ is a total order and sp(tˆ)→ stˆ, we conclude st′ ∗−→ sp(tˆ), and st′ ∗−→ slo.
• Let o = w(k, v) be a write operation. By Claim 7, it holds that ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj . As
t′ se−→ t, it follows that st′ +−→ st and consequently that st′ ∗−→ sp(t). We conclude: st′ ∗−→ slo.
Finally, as PREREADe′(T ) and Tse ⊆ T , by Lemma 3, PREREADe′(Tse) holds.
We conclude that PREREADe′(Tse) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : Wt′ 6= ∅ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ sfo, i.e. ∀t ∈ Tse :
SESSIONRMW (se, t, e’).
MR Finally, we prove that e′ satisfies the final session guarantee: SESSIONMR(se, t, e’). Specifically, we
show that:
PREREADe′(Tse) ∧ IRCe′(t) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : ∀o′ ∈ Σt′ : sfo′ ∗−→ slo. Intuitively, this states that the
read state of o must include any write seen by o′.
We proceed to prove that each of the three clauses holds true.
The first clause follows directly from Lemma 3 and the fact that Tse ⊆ T . We can then conclude that
sfo, sfo′ , slo, slo′ must exist.
We can now proceed to prove that the third clause holds. We consider two cases, depending on whether o′ is a
read or a write operation.
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Read The read operation o′ = r(k′, v′) entails the existence of an update transaction tˆ′ ∈ T that writes
version v′ of object k′, i.e sfo′ = stˆ′ , k ∈ Wtˆ′ . Now, o can be either a read or a write operation.
• Let us first assume that o is a read operation o = r(k, v). Its candidate read set is RSe′(o) = {s ∈
Se′ |s ∗−→ sp(t) ∧
(
(k, v) ∈ s ∨ (∃w(k, v) ∈ Σt : w(k, v) to−→ r(k, v))
)}. slo, the last state inRSe′(o) can
be one of two cases slo = sp(t), disallowing states created after t’s commit point, or slo = sp(tˆ), where tˆ
is the update transaction that writes the next version of k.
– slo = sp(t). We previously proved that ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj . By construction,
t′ se−→ t. It follows that st′ +−→ st and consequently that st′ ∗−→ sp(t). Given sp(t) = slo, we
conclude: st′
∗−→ slo. Moreover, Lemma 2 states that given PREREADe′(Tse), we have sfo′ +−→ st′
in e′, hence: sfo′
∗−→ slo in e′.
– slo = sp(tˆ). Consider first the relationships between read states and commit states in e. By
assumption, e satisfies ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMR(se, t, e), i.e. sfo′ ∗−→ slo in e. Since tˆ wrote the
next version of the object that t read, we have that in slo
+−→ stˆ in e. Combining the guarantee given
by monotonic reads sfo′
∗−→ slo and slo +−→ stˆ, we obtain sfo′ +−→ stˆ in e, i.e. stˆ′
+−→ stˆ. Returning
to the execution e′, since tˆ′ and tˆ are both update transactions,Wtˆ′ 6= ∅ ∧Wtˆ 6= ∅; if stˆ′
+−→ stˆ in e,
then stˆ′
+−→ stˆ in e′. By definition sfo′ +−→ st′ . Moreover, by assumption, slo = sp(tˆ). Putting this
together, we obtain the desired result sfo′
∗−→ slo in e′.
• Let o = w(k, v) be a write operation. The write set of a write operation is defined as RSe′(o) = {s ∈
Se|s ∗−→ sp}. It follows that: slo = sp(t). We previously proved that in e′, ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj :
sti
+−→ stj : given t′ se−→ t, it thus follows that st′ +−→ st, and consequently that st′ ∗−→ sp(t). Noting that
sp(t) = slo , we write st′
∗−→ slo. Moreover, as PREREADe′(Tse) holds for e′, by Lemma 2, we have
sfo′
+−→ st′ in e′. Combining the relationships, we conclude: sfo′ +−→ slo in e′.
Write The candidate read state set for a write operation o′ = w(k, v) is defined as the set of all states before
t′’s commit state. Hence sfo′ = s0. Thus sfo′
∗−→ slo trivially holds.
We can now prove that the second clause, IRCe′(t), holds—namely, that ∀o, o′ ∈ Σt : o′ to−→ o⇒ sfo′ ∗−→ slo.
Once again we consider two cases, depending on whether o′ is a read or a write operation.
Read The presumpted read operation o′ = r(k′, v′) entails the existence of an update transaction tˆ′ ∈ T that
writes version v′ of object k′, i.e sfo′ = stˆ′ , k ∈ Wtˆ′ .
• Let us first assume that o is a read operation o = r(k, v), Its candidate read set RSe′(o) = {s ∈
Se′ |s ∗−→ sp(t) ∧
(
(k, v) ∈ s ∨ (∃w(k, v) ∈ Σt : w(k, v) to−→ r(k, v))
)}. slo, the last state in
RSe′(o) can have one of two values: slo = sp(t), disallowing states created after t’s commit point, or
slo = sp(tˆ), where tˆ is the update transaction that writes the next version of k.
– slo = sp(t). We previously showed that PREREADe′(T ). Given that o′, like o is in Σt, it
follows by Lemma 2 that sfo′
+−→ st in e′, and consequently that sfo′ ∗−→ sp(t). Setting sp(t) to
slo, we conclude sfo′
∗−→ slo in e′.
– slo = sp(tˆ): Consider first the relationships between read states and commit states in e. By
assumption, e satisfies IRCe(t), i.e. sfo′
∗−→ slo holds in e. Since tˆ wrote the next version of
the object that o read, we have that slo
∗−→ sp(tˆ) +−→ stˆ in e. Combining the guarantee given
by monotonic reads sfo′
∗−→ slo and slo +−→ stˆ, it follows that sfo′ +−→ stˆ in e i.e. stˆ′
+−→ stˆ.
Returning to the execution e′, since tˆ′ and tˆ are both update transactions,Wtˆ′ 6= ∅ ∧ Wtˆ 6= ∅,
if stˆ′
+−→ stˆ in e, then stˆ′
+−→ stˆ and consequently sfo′ +−→ stˆ . Given e′ is a total order and
sp(tˆ)→ stˆ, we conclude sfo′ ∗−→ sp(tˆ), and sfo′ ∗−→ slo in e′, as desired.
• Let us next assume that o is a write operation. The candidate read set of a write operation o = w(k, v)
is RSe′(o) = {s ∈ Se|s ∗−→ sp}, where, consequently, slo = sp(t). We previously showed that
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PREREADe′(T ). Given that o′, like o is in Σt, it follows by Lemma 2 that sfo′ +−→ st in e′, and
consequently that sfo′
∗−→ sp(t). Setting p(t) to slo, we conclude sfo′ ∗−→ slo in e′.
Write The candidate read state set for a write operation o′ = w(k, v) is defined as the set of all states before
t′’s commit state. Hence sfo′ = s0. Thus sfo′
∗−→ slo trivially holds.
We conclude that IRCe′(t) holds.
This completes the proof that Monotonic Reads holds for execution e′. This was the last outstanding session
guarantees: we have then proved that e′ satisfies all four session guarantees.
We now proceed to prove that e′ satisfies causal consistency: ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONcc(se, t, e’). More specifically,
we must prove that: PREREADe′(T ) ∧ IRCe′(t) ∧ (∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : st′ ∗−→ slo) ∧ (∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj :
sti
+−→ stj ). We proceed by proving that each of the clauses holds.
The first two clauses are easy to establish. We previously proved that PREREADe′(T ) holds. Likewise, IRCe′(t)
holds as ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMR(se, t, e’). To establish the fourth clause, we note that we previously proved that
∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj .
We are then left to prove only the third clause; namely we must prove that ∀tj ∈ Tse : (∀oj ∈ Σtj : ∀ti se−→ tj :
sti
∗−→ sloj ).
We distinguish between two cases: ti is an update transaction and ti is a read-only transaction. If ti is an update
transaction, the desired result holds as e′ guarantees read-my-writes: ∀tj ∈ Tse : (∀oj ∈ Σtj : ∀ti se−→ tj :Wti 6= ∅ ⇒
sti
∗−→ sloj )
If ti is a read-only transaction, we proceed by induction. We consider an arbitrary tj , and an arbitrary oj ∈ Σtj .
Base Case Consider the first read-only transaction ti in se′ such that ti
se′−−→ tj . Recall that we choose the parent
state of a read-only transaction as sp(ti) = max{maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}, sti−1}, where ti−1 denotes the transaction that
directly precedes ti in session se′ (sti−1 = s0 if ti is the first transaction in the session). Hence, ti’s parent state is
either sp(ti) = maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}, or sp(ti) = sti−1 .
• If sp(ti) = maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}: We previously proved that ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMR(se, t, e’), hence that
∀ti se−→ tj : ∀oi ∈ Σti : sfoi ∗−→ sloj , and consequently maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}
∗−→ sloj in e′. Noting that
sp(ti) = maxoi∈Σti{sfoi}, we obtain the desired result sp(ti)
∗−→ sloj in e′.
• If sp(ti) = sti−1 . We defined ti to be the first read-only transaction in the session. By construction ti−1 se
′
−−→ ti,
ti−1 is necessarily an update transaction given ti is the first read-only transaction, whereWti−1 6= ∅. Given that,
by transitivity ti−1
se−→ tj , and that e′ guarantees read-my-writes ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONRMW (se, t, e’), we have
st′i−1
∗−→ sloj in e′. Noting that sp(ti) = sti−1 , we conclude sp(ti) ∗−→ sloj in e′.
Finally, we argue that sp(ti) 6= sloj (and therefore that sti ∗−→ sloj as sp(ti) s−→ti). Read-only transactions, like ti
do not change the state on which they are applied, hence ∀(k, v) ∈ sp(ti) ⇒ (k, v) ∈ sti . Moreover, by Claim 7,
transactions commit in session order: ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj . We thus have sti +−→ stj and consequently
sp(ti) ∈ RSe′(oj) ⇒ sti ∈ RSe′(oj), i.e. sp(ti) 6= sloj : if sp(ti) is in RSe′(oj), so is sti . As sti follows
sp(ti) in the execution, sp(ti) will never be sfoj . The following thus holds in the base case: sp(ti)
+−→ sloj , i.e.
sp(ti)→ sti ∗−→ sloj .
Induction Step Consider the k-th read-only transaction ti in se′ such that ti
se′−−→ tj . We assume that it satisfies
the induction hypothesis sti
∗−→ sloj . Now consider the (k+1)-th read-only transaction ti′ in se′, such that ti se
′
−−→ ti′ .
By construction, we once again distinguish two cases: ti′’s parent state is either sp(ti′) = maxoi′∈Σt′
i
{sfo′i}, or
sp(ti′) = sti′−1 , where ti′−1 denotes the transaction directly preceding ti′ in a session.
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1. If sp(ti′) = maxoi′∈Σti′ {sfoi′}. We previously proved that ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONMR(se, t, e’), hence that
∀ti′ se−→ tj : ∀oi′ ∈ Σti′ : sfoi′
∗−→ sloj , and consequently maxoi′∈Σti′ {sfoi′}
∗−→ sloj in e′. Noting that
sp(ti′) = maxoi′∈Σti′ {sfoi′}, we obtain the desired result sp(ti′)
∗−→ sloj in e′.
2. If sp(ti′) = sti′−1 : First, we note that ti′−1
se′−−→ tj holds, as the session order is transitive and we have
both ti′−1
se′−−→ ti′ and ti′ se
′
−−→ j. We distinguish between two cases: if ti′−1 is a read-only transaction,
then it must be the k-th such transaction (as, by construction, it directly precedes ti′ in the session). Hence
ti′−1 = ti. Our induction hypothesis states that sti
∗−→ sloj , and consequently that sti′−1
∗−→ sloj . Noting
that sp(ti′) = sti′−1 , we obtain sp(ti′)
∗−→ sloj . If ti′−1 is an update transaction, we note that e′ guarantee
read-my-writes: ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONRMW (se, t, e’). As ti′−1 se−→ tj , we have sti′−1
∗−→ sloj in e′. Noting that
sp(ti′) = sti′−1 , we conclude: sp(ti′)
∗−→ sloj in e′.
Finally, we argue that sp(ti′) 6= sloj (and therefore that sti′
∗−→ sloj as sp(ti′) → sti′ ). Read-only transactions, like
ti′ do not change the state on which they are applied, hence ∀(k, v) ∈ sp(ti′)⇒ (k, v) ∈ sti′ . Moreover, by Claim 7,
transactions commit in session order: ∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti′ se
′
−−→ tj : sti′
+−→ stj . We thus have sti′
+−→ stj and consequently
sp(ti′) ∈ RSe′(oj) ⇒ sti′ ∈ RSe′(oj), i.e. sp(ti′) 6= sloj : if sp(ti′) is in RSe′(oj), so is sti′ . As sti′ succedes
sp(ti′) in the execution, sp(ti′) will never be sloj . The following thus holds in the induction case: sp(ti′)
+−→ sloj ,
i.e. sp(ti′)→ sti′
∗−→ sloj . We proved the desired result for both the base case and induction step. By induction, we
conclude that, for read-only transactions: ∀tj ∈ Tse, ∀oj ∈ Σtj : ∀ti se−→ tj ,Wti = ∅ ⇒ sti ∗−→ sloj . Hence, the
desired result holds for both read-only and update transactions ∀tj ∈ Tse : (∀oj ∈ Σtj : ∀ti se−→ tj : sti ∗−→ sloj ).
Conclusion Putting everything together, if e guarantees all four session guarantees, there exists an equivalent
execution e′ such that e′ also satisfies the session guarantees and is causally consistent: PREREADe(T ) ∧ IRCe(t) ∧
(∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ se−→ t : st′ ∗−→ slo) ∧ (∀se′ ∈ SE : ∀ti se
′
−−→ tj : sti +−→ stj ), i.e. ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONCC(se, t, e’).
This completes the second part of the proof.
Consequently, ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONG(se, t, e) ≡ ∀se ∈ SE : ∃e : ∀t ∈ Tse : SESSIONCC(se, t, e)
holds.
Appendix D Equivalence of PL-2+ and PSI
In this section, we prove that our state-based definition of PSI is equivalent to both the axiomatic formulation of PSI
(PSIA) by Cerone et al. and to the cycle-based specification of PL-2+:
Theorem 5 Let I be PSI. Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-single
Theorem 6 Let I be PSI. Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e) ≡ PSIA
Before beginning, we first prove a useful lemma: if an execution e, written s0 → st1 → st2 → · · · → stn satisfies
the predicate PREREADe(T ), then any transaction t that depends on a transaction t′ will always commit after t′ and
all its dependents in the execution. We do so in two steps: we first prove that t will commit after the transactions that it
directly reads from (Lemma 4), and then extend that result to all the transaction’s transitive dependencies (Lemma 5).
Formally
Lemma 4. PREREADe(T )⇒ ∀tˆ ∈ T : ∀t ∈ D-PRECe(tˆ), st +−→ stˆ
Proof. Consider any tˆ ∈ T and any t ∈ D-PRECe(tˆ). t is included in D-PRECe(tˆ) if one of two cases hold: if
∃o ∈ Σtˆ, t = tsfo (tˆ reads the value created by t) or st +−→ stˆ ∧Wtˆ ∩Wt 6= ∅ (t and tˆ write the same objects and t
commits before tˆ).
1. t ∈ {t|∃o ∈ Σtˆ : t = tsfo} Let oi be the operation such that t = tsfoi . By assumption, we have PREREADe(T )
It follows that ∀o, sfo +−→ stˆ. and consequently that sfoi +−→ stˆ and st +−→ stˆ.
2. t ∈ {t|st +−→ stˆ ∧Wtˆ ∩Wt 6= ∅}, trivially we have st +−→ stˆ.
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We now generalise the result to hold transitively.
Lemma 5. PREREADe(T )⇒ ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : st′ +−→ st.
Proof. We prove this implication by induction.
Base Case Consider the first transaction t1 in the execution. We want to prove that for all transactions t that
precede t1 in the execution st
∗−→ st1 : ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : st′ ∗−→ st. As t1 is the first transaction in the execution,
D-PRECe(t1) = ∅ and consequently PRECe(t) = ∅. We see this by contradiction: assume there exists a transaction
t ∈ D-PRECe(t1), by implication st +−→ st1 (Lemma 4), violating our assumption that t1 is the first transaction in the
execution. Hence the desired result trivially holds.
Induction Step Consider the i-th transaction in the execution. We assume that ∀t s.t. st ∗−→ si the property
∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : st′ ∗−→ st holds. In otherwords, we assume that the property holds for the first i transactions. We now
prove that the property holds for the first i+1 transactions, specifically, we show that ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(ti+1) : st′ ∗−→ sti+1 .
A transaction t′ belongs to PRECe(ti+1) if one of two conditions holds: either t′ ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1), or ∃tk ∈ T :
t′ ∈ PRECe(tk) ∧ tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1). We consider each in turn:
• If t′ ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1): by Lemma 4, we have st′ +−→ sti+1 .
• If ∃tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1) : t′ ∈ PRECe(tk): As tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1), by Lemma 4, we have stk +−→ sti+1 ,
i.e. stk
∗−→ sti (sti directly precedes sti+1 in e by construction). The induction hypothesis holds for every
transaction that strictly precedes ti+1 in e, hence ∀tk′ ∈ PRECe(tk) : stk′
+−→ stk . As t′ ∈ PRECe(tk)
by construction, it follows that st′
+−→ stk . Putting everything together, we have st′ +−→ stk +−→ sti+1 , and
consequently st′
+−→ sti+1 . This completes the induction step of the proof.
Combining the base case, and induction step, we conclude: PREREADe(T )⇒ ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : st′ +−→ st.
Appendix D.1 PL-2+
Theorem 5 Let I be PSI. Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-Single
Let us consider a history H that contains the same set of transactions T as e. The version order for H , denoted as
<<, is instantiated as follows: given an execution e and an object x, xi << xj if and only if x ∈ Wti∩Wtj ∧sti ∗−→ stj .
We show that, if a transaction t is in the depend set of a transaction t′, then there exists a path of write-read/write-write
dependencies from t to t′ in the DSG(H). Formally:
Lemma 6. PREREADe(T )⇒ ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : t′ ww/wr−−−−−→
+
t in DSG(H).
Proof. We improve this implication by induction.
Base Case Consider the first transaction t1 in the execution. We want to prove that for all transactions t that precede
t1 in the execution ∀t ∈ T such that st ∗−→ st1 , the following holds: ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : t′
ww/wr−−−−−→
+
t in DSG(H).
As t1 is the first transaction in the execution, D-PRECe(t1) = ∅ and consequently PRECe(t) = ∅. We see this by
contradiction: assume there exists a transaction t ∈ D-PRECe(t1), by implication st +−→ st1 (Lemma 4), violating our
assumption that t1 is the first transaction in the execution. ence the implication trivially holds.
Induction Step Consider the i-th transaction in the execution. We assume that ∀t, s.t. st ∗−→ sti , ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) :
t′
ww/wr−−−−−→
+
t. In otherwords, we assume that the property holds for the first i transactions. We now prove that the
property holds for the first i+1 transactions, specifically, we show that ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(ti+1) : t′ ww/wr−−−−−→
+
ti+1. A
transaction t′ belongs to PRECe(ti+1) if one of two conditions holds: either t′ ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1), or ∃tk ∈ T : t′ ∈
PRECe(tk) ∧ tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1). We consider each in turn:
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• If t′ ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1): There are two cases: t′ ∈ {t|∃o ∈ Σti+1 : t = tsfo} or, t′ ∈ {t|st +−→ sti+1 ∧Wti+1 ∩
Wt 6= ∅}. If t′ ∈ {t|∃o ∈ Σti+1 : t = tsfo}, ti+1 reads the version of an object that t′ wrote, hence ti+1
read-depends on t′, i.e. t′ wr−−→ t.
If t′ ∈ {t|st +−→ sti+1 ∧Wti+1 ∩Wt 6= ∅}: trivially, st′ +−→ sti+1 . Let x be the key that is written by t and ti+1:
x ∈ Wti+1 ∩Wt. By construction, the history H’s version order for x is xt′ << xti+1 . By definition of version
order, there must therefore a chain of ww edges between t′ and ti+1 in DSG(H), where all of the transactions
in the chain write the next version of x. Thus: t′ ww−−→+ ti+1 holds.
• If ∃tk : t′ ∈ PRECe(tk) ∧ tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1). As tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1), we conclude , as above that
tk
ww/wr−−−−−→
+
ti+1. Moreover, by Lemma 4, we have stk
+−→ sti+1 , i.e. stk ∗−→ sti (sti directly precedes sti+1
in e by construction). The induction hypothesis holds for every transaction that precedes ti+1 in e, hence
∀tk′ ∈ PRECe(tk): tk′ ww/wr−−−−−→
+
tk. Noting t′ ∈ PRECe(tk), we see that t′ ww/wr−−−−−→
+
tk. Putting everything
together, we obtain t′
ww/wr−−−−−→
+
tk
ww/wr−−−−−→
+
ti+1, i.e. t′
ww/wr−−−−−→
+
ti+1 by transitivity.
Combining the base case, and induction step, we conclude: ∀t : ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : t′ ww/wr−−−−−→
+
t.
Equivalence We now prove Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 Let I be PSI. Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e) ≡ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-Single
Proof. Let us recall the definition of PSI’s commit test:
PREREADe(T ) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : o.k ∈ Wt′ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo
(⇒) First we prove ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-Single.
Let e be an execution that ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e), and H be a history for committed transactions T .
We first instantiate the version order for H, denoted as<<, as follows: given an execution e and an object x, xi << xj
if and only if x ∈ Wti ∩Wtj ∧ sti ∗−→ stj . It follows that, for any two states such that (x, xi) ∈ Tm ∧ (x, xj) ∈ Tn ⇒
sTm
+−→ sTn .
G1 We next prove that ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G1:
G1-a Let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1a(aborted reads). There must exists events wi(xi), rj(xi) in
H such that ti subsequently aborted. T and any corresponding execution e, however, consists only of committed
transactions. Hence ∀e :6 ∃s ∈ Se, s.t. s ∈ RSe(rj(xi)): i.e. ¬PREREADe(tj), therefore ¬PREREADe(T ). There
thus exists a transaction for which the commit test cannot be satisfied, for any e. We have a contradiction.
G1-b Let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1b(intermediate reads). In an execution e, only the final writes
of a transaction are applied. Hence,∀e : 6 ∃s ∈ Se, s.t. s ∈ RSe(r(xintermediate)), i.e. ¬PREREADe(t), therefore
¬PREREADe(T ). There thus exists a transaction t, which for all e, will not satisfy the commit test. We once again
have a contradiction.
G1-c Finally, let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G1c: DSG(H) must contain a cycle of read/write
dependencies. We consider each possible edge in the cycle in turn:
• ti ww−−→ tj There must exist an object x such that xi << xj (version order). By construction, version in H is
consistent with the execution order e: we have sti
∗−→ stj .
• ti wr−−→ tj There must exist a read o = rj(xi) ∈ Σtj such that tj reads version xi written by ti. By assumption,
CTPSI(e, tj) holds. By PREREADe(T ) and Lemma 2, we have sfo +−→ stj ; and since sfo exists, sfo = sti . It
follows that sti
+−→ stj .
If a history H displays phenomena G1c there must exist a chain of transactions ti → ti+1 → ...→ tj such that i = j.
A corresponding cycle must thus exist in the execution e: sti
∗−→ sti+1 ∗−→ . . . ∗−→ stj . By definition however, a valid
execution must be totally ordered. We once again have a contradiction.
G-Single We now prove that ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G-Single
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By way of contradiction, let us assume that H exhibits phenomenon G-Single: DSG(H) must contain a directed
cycle with exactly one anti-dependency edge. Let t1
ww/wr−−−−−→ t2 ww/wr−−−−−→ . . . ww/wr−−−−−→ tk rw−−→ t1 be the cycle in
DSG(H).
We first prove by induction that t1 ∈ PRECe(tk), where tk denotes the k − th transaction that succedes t1. We then
show that there exist a t′ ∈ PRECe(tk) such that o.k ∈ Wt′ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo does not hold
Base case We prove that t1 ∈ PRECe(t2). We distinguish between two cases t1 ww−−→ t2, and t1 wr−−→ t2.
• If t1 ww−−→ t2, there must exist an object k that t1 and t2 both write: k ∈ Wt1 and k ∈ Wt2 , therefore
Wt1 ∩ Wt2 6= ∅. By construction, ti ww−−→ tj ⇔ sti ∗−→ stj . Hence we have st1 ∗−→ st2 . By definition of
D-PRECe(t), it follows that t1 ∈ D-PRECe(t2).
• If t1 wr−−→ t2, there must exist an object k such that t2 reads the version of the object created by transaction t1:
o = r(k1). We previously proved that ti
wr−−→ tj ⇒ sti +−→ stj . It follows that st1 +−→ st2 and sfo = st1 , i.e.
t1 = tsfo . By definition, t1 ∈ D-PRECe(t2).
Since D-PRECe(t2) ⊆ PRECe(t2), it follows that t1 ∈ PRECe(t2).
Induction step Assume t1 ∈ PRECe(ti), we prove that t1 ∈ PRECe(ti+1).To do so, we first prove that ti ∈
D-PRECe(ti+1). We distinguish between two cases: ti
ww−−→ ti+1, and ti wr−−→ ti+1.
• If ti ww−−→ ti+1, there must exist an object k that ti and ti+1 both write: k ∈ Wti and k ∈ Wti+1 , therefore
Wti ∩ Wti+1 6= ∅. By construction, ti ww−−→ tj ⇔ sti ∗−→ stj . Hence we have sti ∗−→ sti+1 . By definition of
D-PRECe(t), it follows that ti ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1).
• If ti wr−−→ ti+1, there must exist an object k such that ti+1 reads the version of the object created by transaction
ti: o = r(ki). We previously proved that ti
wr−−→ tj ⇒ sti +−→ stj . It follows that sti +−→ sti+1 and sfo = sti , i.e.
ti = tsfo . By definition, ti ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1).
Hence, ti ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1). The depends set includes the depend set of every transaction that it directly depends on:
consequently PRECe(ti) ⊆ PRECe(ti+1). We conclude: t1 ∈ PRECe(ti+1).
Combining the base step and the induction step, we have proved that t1 ∈ PRECe(tk).
We now derive a contradiction. Consider the edge tk
rw−−→ t1 in the G-Single cycle: tk reads the version of an
object x that precedes the version written by t1. Specifically, there exists a version xm written by transaction tm
such that rk(xm) ∈ Σtk , w1(x1) ∈ Σt1 and xm << x1. By definition of the PSI commit test for transaction tk, if
t1 ∈ PRECe(tk) and t1’s write set intersect with tk’s read set, then st1 ∗−→ slrk(xm).
However, from xm << x1, we have ∀s, s′, s.t.(x, xm) ∈ s ∧ (x, x1) ∈ s′ ⇒ s +−→ s′. Since (x, xm) ∈
slrk(xm) ∧ (x, x1) ∈ st1 , we have slrk(xm) +−→ st1 . We previously proved that T st1 ∗−→ slrk(xm). We have a
contradiction: H does not exhibit phenomenon G-Single, i.e. ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e)⇒ ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-Single.
(⇐) We now prove the other direction ¬G1 ∧ ¬G-Single⇒ ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e).
We construct e as follows: Consider only dependency edges in the DSG(H), by ¬G1, there exist no cycle consisting
of only dependency edges, therefore the transactions can be topologically sorted respecting only dependency edges. Let
i1, ...in be a permutation of 1, 2, ..., n such that ti1 , ..., tin is a topological sort of DSG(H) with only dependency edges.
We construct an execution e according to the topological order defined above: e : s0 → sti1 → sti2 → ...→ stin .
First we show that PREREADe(T ) is true: consider any transaction t, for any operation o ∈ Σt. If o is a internal read
operation or o is a write operation, by definition s0 ∈ RSe(o) henceRSe(o) 6= ∅ follows trivially. Consider the case
now where o is a read operation that reads a value written by another transaction t′. Since the topological order includes
wr edges and e respects the topological order, t′ wr−−→ t in DSG(H) implies st′ ∗−→ st, then for any o = r(x, xt′) ∈ Σt,
st′ ∈ RSe(o), thereforeRSe(o) 6= ∅. Hence we have PREREADe(t) is true. Therefore PREREADe(T ) holds.
Next, we prove that ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : o.k ∈ Wt′ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo holds. For any t′ ∈ PRECe(t), by
Lemma 5, st′
+−→ st. Consider any o ∈ Σt, let t′ be a transaction such that t′ ∈ PRECe(t) ∧ o.k ∈ Wt′ , we now prove
that st′
∗−→ slo. Consider the three possible types of operations in t:
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1. External Reads: an operation reads an object version that was created by another transaction.
2. Internal Reads: an operation reads an object version that itself created.
3. Writes: an operation creates a new object version.
We show that st′
∗−→ slo for each of those operation types:
1. External Reads. Let o = r(x, xtˆ) ∈ Σt read the version for x created by tˆ, where tˆ 6= t. Since PREREADe(t)
is true, we haveRSe(o) 6= ∅, therefore stˆ +−→ st and tˆ = tsfo . From tˆ = tsfo , we have tˆ ∈ D-PRECe(t). Now
consider t′ and tˆ, we have currently proved that st′
+−→ st and stˆ +−→ st. There are two cases:
• st′ ∗−→ stˆ: Consequently st′ ∗−→ stˆ = sfo ∗−→ slo It follows that st′ ∗−→ slo.
• stˆ +−→ st′ : We prove that this cannot happen by contradiction. Since o.k ∈ Wt′ , t′ also writes key xt′ .
By construction, , stˆ
+−→ st′ in e implies xtˆ << xt′ . There must consequently exist a chain of ww edges
between tˆ and t′ in DSG(H), where all the transactions on the chain writes a new version of key x. Now
consider the transaction in the chain directly after to tˆ, denoted as tˆ+1, where tˆ
ww−−→ tˆ+1 ww−−→
∗
t′. tˆ+1
overwrites the version of x t reads. Consequently, t directly anti-depends on tˆ+1, i.e. t
rw−−→ tˆ+1. Moreover
t′ ∈ PRECe(t), by Lemma 6, we have t′ ww/wr−−−−−→
+
t. There thus exists a cycle consists of only one anti
dependency edges as t rw−−→ tˆ+1 ww−−→
∗
t′
ww/wr−−−−−→
+
t, in contradiction with G-Single. st′
∗−→ stˆ holds.
st′
∗−→ stˆ holds in all cases. Noting that stˆ = slo, we conclude st′ ∗−→ slo.
2. Internal Reads. Let o = r(x, xt) read xt such that w(x, xt)
to−→ r(x, xt). By definition of RSe(o), we have
slo = sp(t). Since we have proved that st′
+−→ st, therefore we have st′ ∗−→ sp(t) = slo (as sp(t)→ st).
3. Writes. Let o = w(x, xt) be a write operation. By definition of RSe(o), we have slo = sp(t). We previously
proved that st′
+−→ st. Consequently we have st′ ∗−→ sp(t) = slo (as sp(t)→ st).
We conclude, in all cases, CTPSI(t, e) ≡ PREREADe(t) ∧ ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : o.k ∈ Wt′ ⇒ st′ ∗−→
slo.
Appendix D.2 PSIA
We now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6 Let I be PSI. Then ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e) ≡ PSIA
We note that this axiomatic specification, defined by Cerone et al. [20,21] is proven to be equivalent to the operational
specification of Sovran et al. [52], modulo an additional assumption: that each replica executes each transaction
sequentially. The authors state that this is for syntactic elegance only, and does not change the essence of the proof.
Appendix D.2.1 Model Summary
We provide a brief summary and explanation of the main terminology introduced in Cerone et al.’s framework for
reasoning about concurrency. We refer the reader to [20] for the full set of definitions.
The authors consider a database storing a set of objectsObj = {x, y, ...}, with operationsOp = {read(x, n), write(x, n)|x ∈
Obj, n ∈ Z}. For simplicity, the authors assume the value space to be Z.
Definition 29. History events are tuples of the form (ι, op), where ι is an identifier from a countably infinite set
EventId and op ∈ Op. Let WEventx = {(ι, write(x, n))|ι ∈ EventId, n ∈ Z}, REventx = {(ι, write(x, n))|ι ∈
EventId, n ∈ Z}, and HEventx = REventx ∩WEventx.
Definition 30. A transaction T is a pair (E, po), where E ⊆ HEvent is an non-empty set of events with distinct
identifiers, and the program order po is a total order over E. A historyH is a set of transactions with disjoint sets of
event identifiers.
Definition 31. An abstract execution is a triple A = (H, V IS,AR) where: visibility V IS ⊆ H ×H is an acyclic
relation; and arbitration AR ⊆ H×H is a total order such that AR ⊇ V IS.
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For simplicity, we summarise the model’s main notation specificities:
• Denotes a value that is irrelevant and implicitly existentially quantified.
• maxR(A) Given a total orderR and a setA, maxR(A) is the element u ∈ A such that ∀v ∈ A.v = u∨(v, u) ∈
R.
• R−1(u) For a relation R ⊆ A×A and an element u ∈ A, we let R−1(u) = {v|(v, u) ∈ R}.
• T `Write x : n T writes to x and the last value written is n: maxpo(E ∩WEventx) = ( , write(x, n)).
• T ` Read x : n T makes an external read from x, i.e., one before writing to x, and n is the value returned by
the first such read: minpo(E ∩HEventx) = ( , read(x, n)).
The authors introduce a number of consistency axioms. A consistency model specification is a set of consistency
axioms Φ constraining executions. The model allow those histories for which there exists an execution that satisfies the
axioms:
Definition 32. HistΦ = {H|∃V is,AR.(H, AR)  Φ}
The authors define several consistency axioms:
Definition 33. INT ∀(E, po) ∈ H.∀event ∈ E.∀x, n.(event = ( , read(x, n)) ∧ (po−1(event) ∩ HEventx 6= ∅))
⇒ maxpo(po−1(event) ∩ HEventx) = ( , (x, n))
EXT ∀T ∈ H.∀x, n.T ` Read x : n⇒ ((V IS−1(T ) ∩ {S|S `Write x : } = ∅ ∧ n = 0)∨
maxAR((V IS
−1(T ) ∩ {S|S `Write x : }) `Write x : n)
TRANSVIS VIS is transitive
NOCONFLICT ∀T, S ∈ H.(T 6= S ∧ T `Writex : ∧ S `Writex : )⇒ (T V IS−−−→ S ∨ S V IS−−−→ T )
PSIA is then defined with the following set of consistency axioms.
Definition 34. PSI allows histories for which there exists an execution that satisfies INT, EXT, TRANSVIS and
NOCONFLICT: HistPSI = {H|∃V IS,AR.(H, V IS,AR) |= INT, EXT, TRANSVIS, NOCONFLICT}.
Appendix D.2.2 Equivalence
We first relate Cerone et al.’s notion of transactions to transactions in our model: Cerone defines transactions as a tuple
(E, po) where E is a set of events and po is a program order over E. Our model similalry defines transactions as a tuple
(Σt,
to−→), where Σt is a set of operations, and to−→ is the total order on Σt. These definitions are equivalent: events
defined in Cerone are extensions of operations in our model (events include a unique identifier), while the partial order
in Cerone maps to the program order in our model. For clarity, we denote transactions in Cerone’s model as T and
transactions in our model as t. Finally, we relate our notion of versions to Cerone’s values.
(⇒) We first prove ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e)⇒ PSIA.
Construction Let e be an execution such that ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e). We construct AR and V IS as follows: AR is
defined as Ti
AR−−→ Tj ⇔ sti −→ stj while V IS order is defined as Ti V IS−−−→ Tj ⇔ ti ∈ PRECe(tj). By definition, our
execution is a total order, hence our constructed AR is also a total order. V IS defines an acyclic partial order that is a
subset of AR ( by PREREADe(T ) and Lemma 5).
We now prove that each consistency axiom holds:
INT ∀(E, po) ∈ H.∀event ∈ E.∀x, n.(event = ( , read(x, n)) ∧ (po−1(event) ∩ HEventx 6= ∅))
⇒ maxpo(po−1(event) ∩ HEventx) = ( , (x, n)) Intuitively, the consistency axiom INT ensures that the read of an
object returns the value of the transaction’s last write to that object (if it exists).
For any (E, po) ∈ H, we consider any event and x such that (event = ( , read(x, n))∧(po−1(event)∩HEventx 6=
∅)). We prove that maxpo(po−1(event) ∩ HEventx) = ( , (x, n)). By assumption, (po−1(event) ∩ HEventx 6= ∅))
holds, there must exist an event such that maxpo(po−1(event) ∩ HEventx). This event is either a read operation, or a
write operation:
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1. If op = maxpo(po−1(event) ∩ HEventx) is a write operation: given event = ( , read(x, n)) and op po−→
event, the equivalent statement in our model is w(x, vop)
to−→ r(x, n). By definition, our model enforces that
w(k, v′) to−→ r(k, v) ⇒ v = v′. Hence vop = n, i.e. op = ( , write(x, n)), therefore op = ( , (x, n). Hence
INT holds.
2. If op = maxpo(po−1(event) ∩ HEventx) is a read operation, We write op = ( , read(x, vop)). The equivalent
formulation in our model is as follows. For event = ( , read(x, n)), we write o1 = r(x, n), and for op, we
write o2 = r(x, vop) with o2
to−→ o1 where o1, o2 ∈ Σt. Now we consider the following two cases.
First, let us assume that there exists an operation w(k, v) such that w(k, v) to−→ o2 to−→ o1 (all three operations
belong to the same transaction). Given that to−→ is a total order, we have w(k, v) to−→ o1 and w(k, v) to−→ o2.
It follows by definition of candidate read state that w(k, v′) to−→ r(k, v) ⇒ v = v′, where v = n ∧ v = vop,
i.e. vop = n. Hence op = ( , (x, n) and INT holds. Second, let us next assume that there does not exist
an operation w(k, v) to−→ o2 to−→ o1. We prove by contradiction that vop = n nonetheless. Assume that
vop 6= n, and consider transactions t1 that writes (x, n), and t2 that writes (x, vop), by PREREADe(T ) ,
we know that sfo1 , sfo2 exist. We have t1 = tsfo1 and t2 = tsfo2 . By definition of PRECe(t), we have
t1, t2 ∈ D-PRECe(t) ⊆ PRECe(t), i.e. t1, t2 ∈ PRECe(t).
We note that the sequence of states containing (x, n) is disjoint from states containing (x, vop): in otherwords, the
sequence of states bounded by sfo1 and slo1 and sfo2 and slo2 are disjoint. Hence, we have either st1
∗−→ slo1 +−→
st2
∗−→ slo2 , or st2 ∗−→ slo2 +−→ st1 ∗−→ slo1 . Equivalently either t2 ∈ PRECe(t) ∧ o1.k ∈ Wt2 ∧ slo1 +−→ st2 ,
or t1 ∈ PRECe(t) ∧ o2.k ∈ Wt1 ∧ slo2 +−→ st1 . In both cases, this violates CTPSI(t, e), a contradiction. We
conclude vop = n, i.e. op = ( , read(x, n)), therefore op = ( , (x, n).
We proved that maxpo(po−1(event) ∩ HEventx) = ( , (x, n)). INT holds.
EXT We now prove that EXT holds forH. Specifically,
∀T ∈ H.∀x, n.T ` Read x : n⇒ ((V IS−1(T ) ∩ {S|S `Write x : } = ∅ ∧ n = 0)∨
maxAR((V IS
−1(T ) ∩ {S|S `Write x : }) `Write x : n)
We proceed in two steps, we first show that there exist a transaction T that wrote (x,n), and next we show that T
is the most recent such transaction. Consider any T ∈ H.∀x, n.T ` Read x : n (a external read). Equivalently, we
consider a transaction t in our model such that r(x, n) ∈ Σt. Let tn be the transaction that writes (x, n). By assumption,
PREREADe(T ) holds hence sfo exists and sfo = stn , i.e. tn = tsfo , as tn created the first state from which o could
read from. By definition of PRECe(t), we have tn ∈ D-PRECe(t) ⊆ PRECe(t), i.e. tn ∈ PRECe(t). Moreover, we
defined V IS as Ti
V IS−−−→ Tj ⇔ ti ∈ PRECe(tj). Hence, we have Tn V IS−−−→ T , and consequently Tn ∈ V IS−1(T ).
Since write(x, n) ∈ Σtn , Tn `Write x : n.
Next, we show that Tn is larger than any other transaction T ′ in AR: T ′
V IS−−−→ T ∧ T ′ `Write x : . Consider the
equivalent transaction t′ in our model, we know that t′ ∈ PRECe(t) (T ′ V IS−−−→ T ) and x ∈ Wt′ . As o = r(x, n) ∈ Σt
and t′ ∈ PRECe(t) ∧ o.k ∈ Wt′ , CTPSI(t, e) implies that st′ ∗−→ slo. We note that the sequence of states containing
(x, n) is disjoint from states containing (x, xt′). It follows that st′
∗−→ sfo = stn . We can strengthen this to say st′ +−→
sfo = stn as t
′ 6= tn. By construction, we have T ′ AR−−→ Tn, i.e. Tn = maxAR((V IS−1(T ) ∩ {S|S `Write x : }).
We conclude, EXT holds.
TRANSVIS We first prove that ti ∈ PRECe(tj)∧ tj ∈ PRECe(tk)⇒ ti ∈ PRECe(tk) and use this result to prove
that V IS is transitive.
We proceed by induction, let e be s0 → st1 → st2 → · · · → stn :
Base Case Consider the first transaction t1 in the execution. We want to prove that for all transactions t that precede
t1 in the execution ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t1) : PRECe(t′) ⊆ PRECe(t1) As t1 is the first transaction in the execution,
D-PRECe(t1) = ∅ and consequently PRECe(t) = ∅. We see this by contradiction: assume there exists a transaction
t ∈ D-PRECe(t1), by implication st +−→ st1 (Lemma 4), violating our assumption that t1 is the first transaction in the
execution. Hence the desired result trivially holds.
Induction Step Consider the i-th transaction in the execution. We assume that ∀t s.t. st ∗−→ si the property
∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : PRECe(t′) ⊆ PRECe(t) holds. In other words, we assume that the property holds for the
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first i transactions. We now prove that the property holds for the first i+1 transactions, specifically, we show that
∀t′ ∈ PRECe(ti+1) : PRECe(t′) ⊆ PRECe(ti+1). A transaction t′ belongs to PRECe(ti+1) if one of two conditions
holds: either t′ ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1), or ∃tk ∈ T : t′ ∈ PRECe(tk) ∧ tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1). We consider each in turn:
• If t′ ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1): by definition of PRECe(ti+1), PRECe(t′) ⊆ PRECe(ti+1).
• If ∃tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1) : t′ ∈ PRECe(tk): As tk ∈ D-PRECe(ti+1), by definition of PRECe(ti+1),
PRECe(tk) ⊆ PRECe(ti+1). Moreover, by Lemma 4, we have stk +−→ sti+1 , i.e. stk ∗−→ sti (sti directly
precedes sti+1 in e by construction). The induction hypothesis holds for every transaction that strictly precedes
ti+1 in e, hence ∀tk′ ∈ PRECe(tk) : PRECe(tk′) ⊆ PRECe(tk). As t′ ∈ PRECe(tk) by construction, it
follows that PRECe(t′) ⊆ PRECe(tk). Putting everything together, we have PRECe(t′) ⊆ PRECe(tk) ⊆
PRECe(ti+1), and consequently PRECe(t′) ⊆ PRECe(ti+1). This completes the induction step of the proof.
Combining the base case, and induction step, we conclude: ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : PRECe(t′) ⊆ PRECe(t).
If Ti
V IS−−−→ Tj ∧ Tj V IS−−−→ Tk, by construction we have ti ∈ PRECe(tj)∧ tj ∈ PRECe(tk). From tj ∈ PRECe(tk),
we know, by induction, that PRECe(tj) ⊆ PRECe(tk), and consequently that
ti ∈ PRECe(tk). By construction, we have Ti V IS−−−→ Tk., hence we conclude: V IS is transitive.
NOCONFLICT ∀T, S ∈ H.(T 6= S ∧ T `Write x : ∧ S `Writex : )⇒ (T V IS−−−→ S ∨ S V IS−−−→ T )
Consider any T, S ∈ H.(T 6= S ∧ T `Write x : ∧ S `Writex : ) and let ti, tj be the equivalent transactions
in our model such that w(x, xi) ∈ Σti and w(x, xj) ∈ Σtj and consequently x ∈ Wti ∩ Wtj . Since e totally
orders all the committed transactions, we have either sti
+−→ stj or stj +−→ sti . If sti +−→ stj , it follows from
sti
+−→ stj ∧ Wti ∩ Wtj 6= ∅ that ti ∈ D-PRECe(tj) ⊆ PRECe(tj), i.e. ti ∈ PRECe(tj), and consequently
T
V IS−−−→ S.
Similarly, if stj
+−→ sti , it follows from stj +−→ sti ∧Wti ∩Wtj 6= ∅ that tj ∈ D-PRECe(ti) ⊆ PRECe(ti), i.e.
tj ∈ PRECe(ti), and consequently S V IS−−−→ T .
We conclude: T V IS−−−→ S ∨ S V IS−−−→ T , NOCONFLICT is true.
(⇐) Now we prove that PSIA ⇒ ∃e : ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e).
By assumption, AR is a total order over T . We construct an execution e by applying transactions in the same order as
AR, i.e. sti
+−→ stj ⇔ Ti AR−−→ Tj and subsequently prove that e satisfies ∀t ∈ T : CTPSI(t, e).
Preread First we show that PREREADe(T ) is true: consider any transaction t, for any operation o ∈ Σt. If o
is a internal read operation or o is a write operation, by definition sfo = s0 hence sfo
∗−→ st follows trivially. On
the other hand, consider the case where o is a read operation that reads a value written by another transaction t′: let
T and T ′ be the corresponding transaction in Cerone’s model. We have T ` Read x : n and T ′ ` Write x : n.
Assuming that values are uniquely identifiable, we have T ′ = maxAR(V IS−1(T ) ∩ {S|S `Write x : }) by EXT,
and consequently T ′ ∈ V IS−1(T ). As V IS ⊆ AR, T ′ V IS−−−→ T and consequently T ′ AR−−→ T . Recall that we apply
transactions in the same order as AR, hence we have st′
+−→ st. Since we have (x, n) ∈ st′ and st′ +−→ st, it follows
that st′ ∈ RSe(o), hence RSe(o) 6= ∅. We conclude: for any transaction t, for any operation o ∈ Σt, RSe(o) 6= ∅,
therefore PREREADe(T ) is true.
Now consider any t ∈ T , we want to prove that ∀o ∈ Σt : ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t) : o.k ∈ Wt′ ⇒ st′ ∗−→ slo.
First we prove that ∀t′ ∈ PRECe(t)⇒ T ′ V IS−−−→ T .
We previously proved that PREREADe(T ) is true. Hence, by Lemma 6 we know that there is a chain t′ wr/ww−−−−−→
+
t.
Consider any edge on the chain: ti
ww/wr−−−−−→ tj :
1. ti
ww−−→ tj : We have Ti, Tj ∈ H and (Ti 6= Tj ∧ Ti ` Write x : ∧ Tj ` Write x : ), therefore by
NOCONFLICT, we have ti
V IS−−−→ tj ∨ tj V IS−−−→ ti. Note that sti ∗−→ stj , we know that ti AR−−→ tj , and since
V IS ⊆ AR, we have ti V IS−−−→ tj .
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2. ti
wr−−→ tj . We map the initial values in Cerone et al from 0 to ⊥. Let n be the value that ti writes and
tj reads. A transaction cannot write empty value, i.e. ⊥, to a key. It follows that Tj ` Read x : n and
n 6= 0. By EXT, maxAR(V IS−1(Tj) ∩ {S|S ` Write x : }) ` Write x : n. Since Ti ` Write x : n,
Ti = maxAR(V IS
−1(Tj) ∩ {S|S `Write x : }) hold, and consequently Ti ∈ V IS−1(Tj), i.e. Ti V IS−−−→ Tj .
Now we consider the chain t′
wr/ww−−−−−→
+
t, and we have that T ′ V IS−−−→
+
T , by TRANSVIS, we have T ′ V IS−−−→ T .
Now, consider any o ∈ Σt such that o.k ∈ Wt′ , let o.k = x, therefore T ′ `Write x : . We previously proved that
T ′ V IS−−−→ T . Hence we have T ′ ∈ V IS−1(T ) ∩ {S|S `Write x : }. Now we consider the following two cases.
If o is an external read, and reads the value (x, xˆ) written by tˆ. As transactions cannot write an empty value, i.e. ⊥,
to a key, we have T ` Read x : xˆ and xˆ 6= 0. By EXT, maxAR(V IS−1(Tj) ∩ {S|S `Write x : }) `Write x : xˆ.
Since Tˆ `Write x : n, we have Tˆ = maxAR(V IS−1(Tj) ∩ {S|S `Write x : }) , therefore T ′ AR−−→ Tˆ or T ′ = Tˆ .
Note that we apply transactions in the same order as AR, therefore we have st′
+−→ stˆ or st′ = stˆ, i.e. st′ ∗−→ stˆ. Since
we proved that PREREADe(t) is true, we have sfo exists and stˆ = sfo, note that by definition sfo
∗−→ slo. Now we
have st′
∗−→ stˆ = sfo ∗−→ slo, therefore st′ ∗−→ slo .
If o is an internal read operation or write operation, then slo = sp(t). Since t′ ∈ PRECe(t), by Lemma 5, we have
st′
+−→ st, therefore st′ ∗−→ sp(t) = slo, i.e. st′ ∗−→ slo.
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